Ukraine’s EU Accession: Choices Ahead (Part 4 of the European Accession Series)

Introduction

Russia’s full-scale invasion made Ukraine’s EU bid both urgent and unprecedented. Following the invasion in February 2022, Kyiv submitted its application within weeks, and by June 2022, the European Council had granted Ukraine candidate status. The process accelerated further when accession negotiations were formally opened in June 2024, with the first intergovernmental conference taking place on June 25 of that year. Since then, the EU and Ukraine have engaged in bilateral screening across multiple thematic clusters, with initial reports submitted to the Council in early and mid-2025. This complex integration process is ongoing and expected to extend further (Hodunova, 2025).

The accession debate has taken on significant urgency amid a complex geopolitical context. The ongoing Russian aggression remains the defining factor shaping Ukraine’s domestic politics and the EU’s strategic calculations. The conflict has intensified the EU’s support for Kyiv, with the EU and its member states providing €164.8 billion in financial support since February 2022 (European Commission, 2025). At the same time, internal developments in Ukraine, particularly controversy over now-renounced legislation perceived to weaken the independence of key anti-corruption bodies, have raised concerns within the EU. The European Commission warned that such legislation would have consequences for EU accession (Sydorenko & Bondarieva, 2025). Ukraine quickly pledged to fix the situation, and its parliament restored the anti-corruption institutions’ independence a week later with an overwhelming constitutional majority (Tarasova-Markina & Nicholls, 2025).

Consequently, the accession process is not only a matter of formal legal adjustments but is deeply intertwined with Ukraine’s domestic political dynamics and the evolving geopolitical landscape. The EU must weigh its strategic interests against the imperative of safeguarding its own cohesion and standards, making Ukraine’s accession one of the most complex enlargement challenges in recent history.

What is at stake for the EU?

Ukraine’s potential accession carries profound economic, geopolitical, and normative implications for the European Union.

From an economic perspective, enlargement would bring an additional 33-37 million citizens—around 7.4% of the EU’s population—and increase the Union’s GDP by $190 billion, or 0.94% (IMF, 2024; European Union, 2025). Such growth would open new opportunities for trade, investment, and economic cooperation. Yet, numbers alone do not capture Ukraine’s significance. The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed the fragility of the European economy and its supply chains, underscoring the urgency of the European Commission’s “European Economic Security Strategy” report, which calls for greater resilience (European Commission, 2023). Ukraine’s role in Europe’s agri-food security illustrates this vividly. In 2024, Ukraine became the third-largest source of agri-food imports, supplying goods worth 8% of the EU’s import value. Between 2021 and 2022, these imports almost doubled, in contrast to agri-food imports from Russia, which have fallen by more than half since 2021 (European Commission, 2025). Should accession proceed, Ukraine’s 32 million hectares of arable land would increase the EU’s arable area by about one-third—an extraordinary resource for European food security. After enlargement, the EU’s share in global wheat exports alone is estimated to be around 30%, even higher than Russia’s (von Ondarza et al., 2022). This war, however, has devastated Ukraine’s agricultural base. About a third of the population has been displaced, fields and infrastructure have been destroyed, livestock and territory lost, and production costs inflated (CEMA, 2023). The World Bank and the Kyiv School of Economics estimate the financial losses to be between $9.3 and $9.8 billion (CEMA, 2023). For the EU, integration would not only require reconstruction assistance but also strain the already contested Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). With CAP absorbing nearly a third of the EU budget, incorporating Ukraine’s farmland would force either a major budgetary expansion or sweeping cuts averaging 20%, an outcome likely to trigger political frictions (Foy, 2023).

Beyond agriculture, Ukraine’s tech sector deserves special emphasis. Between 2016 and 2021, Ukrainian tech exports tripled to almost $7 billion annually, demonstrating resilience even during wartime: in 2022, only 2% of tech firms ceased operations due to the conflict. With more than 4,000 ICT companies, one of Europe’s largest 4G networks, and a globally competitive talent pool, Ukraine could become a pillar of the EU’s digital strategy. For a Union striving to position itself as a digital leader, accession would not only add capacity but also showcase resilience and innovation in the face of existential challenges.

Geopolitically, Ukraine’s accession could advance the EU’s quest for strategic autonomy. The country holds roughly 5% of the world’s mineral resources, including Europe’s largest potential lithium deposits—though estimates vary (Liventseva, 2022; Katser-Buchkovska, 2024). Ukraine ranks among the world’s most notable producers of gallium and neon, both indispensable for semiconductors and high-tech industries (Katser-Buchkovska, 2024). The European Commission already lists Ukraine as a potential source of more than twenty raw materials deemed critical for the EU and needed for its green transition (European Commission, 2023). Properly harnessed, these resources could supply the EU’s efforts in battery production, hydrogen energy, and renewable infrastructure, reducing reliance on external actors.

Furthermore, Ukraine would also affect the EU’s climate trajectory. Since 1990, Ukrainian emissions have fallen at more than twice the pace of the EU-27, suggesting potential contributions to Union-wide reduction targets (von Ondarza et al., 2022). On the other hand, Ukraine’s energy mix remains heavily dependent on conventional sources, and the war has diverted attention from aligning legislation with EU environmental norms. Reconstruction will inevitably prioritize basic infrastructure and security, making green policy convergence a longer-term endeavor.

The symbolic and normative dimension of accession is equally significant. Ukraine has positioned itself as a frontline defender of democratic values against authoritarian aggression. Bringing Ukraine into the Union would reaffirm the EU’s commitment to democracy and human rights at a time when populist and pro-Russian narratives seek to erode it from within. As the Institute of International Relations has argued, such a step could help “rebalance the wave of pro-Russian populism” and underscore that the EU remains a political community bound by shared ideals, not merely economic convenience. However, prioritizing Ukraine while postponing other candidacies may backfire, producing disillusionment or even a rejection of European values, particularly in the Western Balkans, whose access to the union was promised 20 years ago (Bastasin, 2023).

Institutional questions are no less critical. With its 33-37 million citizens, Ukraine would be the largest new member since Spain joined in 1986, with about 7-8% of the EU population (the QMV threshold also requires 65% of the population). Such weight would inevitably reshape coalition dynamics. Yet enlargement is inseparable from ongoing debates about institutional reform. Several member states insist on reforming the EU’s decision-making processes before admitting new members, rendering Ukraine’s accession vulnerable to political calculations beyond Kyiv’s control (Batchik, 2023).

Security concerns magnify these challenges. Unlike Cyprus’s unresolved territorial dispute, Ukraine faces an active war with Russia, a precedent the EU has never encountered in its enlargement history. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán bluntly declared that “whoever accepts Ukraine into the EU is also accepting war,” threatening to veto the accession (Hungary Today, 2025). Even in a post-war scenario, the Union would inherit an extended external border with Russia and Belarus, necessitating costly investments in border management and raising questions about Schengen integration. Internal security risks also cannot be overlooked. The massive circulation of weaponry in Ukraine, reminiscent of the post-Yugoslav Balkans, may complicate border control and crime prevention (von Ondarza et al., 2022).

Considering these subjects, the stakes of Ukraine’s accession for the European Union are tremendously high, ranging from economic and geostrategic benefits to institutional issues and security risks.

What is at stake for Ukraine?

Ukraine’s aspiration to join the European Union represents not only a strategic geopolitical choice but a civilizational one, deeply rooted in its desire to consolidate a European identity, strengthen its democracy, and secure long-term security and prosperity. Since the Euromaidan revolution in 2014, the EU has come to symbolize a normative anchor for Ukraine—a framework through which it seeks to transform its institutions and shed the legacy of post-Soviet authoritarianism (Delcour 2021).

The stakes for Ukraine are particularly high. First, EU accession offers the promise of economic modernization and recovery. After years of structural weakness and, more recently, the devastation caused by the full-scale Russian invasion, Ukraine views EU membership as an essential path to rebuilding infrastructure, attracting foreign investment, and integrating into global markets. Potential access to EU funds, including the Cohesion Fund and Common Agricultural Policy, could provide significant resources for reconstruction (European Commission 2023).

Second, EU membership is a critical component of Ukraine’s national security strategy. Amid ongoing aggression by Russia, EU integration serves as both a deterrent and a signal of Western alignment. While NATO remains a separate and politically more sensitive issue, EU membership would embed Ukraine within the political and economic architecture of Europe, strengthening its sovereignty and reducing its vulnerability to external coercion (Kobzova 2022).

Third, EU accession offers a roadmap for deep domestic reform. Since being granted candidate status in June 2022, Ukraine has undertaken substantial reforms in anti-corruption enforcement, judicial independence, media freedom, and minority rights, meeting all seven of the initial conditions outlined by the EU by mid-2024 (European Commission 2024). The creation of an independent Anti-Corruption Council and the reform of the Constitutional Court are particularly significant (Freedom House 2024). EU conditionality has thus played a vital role in accelerating these changes, reinforcing the rule of law and aligning Ukraine’s institutions with European standards.

At the societal level, public support for EU membership remains robust. A 2024 survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that over 85% of Ukrainians support joining the EU—a level of consensus rare in domestic politics and indicative of a deep social transformation (KIIS 2024). For many Ukrainians, EU accession is not merely a technocratic process but a symbolic affirmation of their European destiny.

Nonetheless, the path is fraught with risks. High expectations could lead to disillusionment if the process stalls. Moreover, the structural reforms required for EU membership are politically costly and administratively demanding, particularly during wartime. Still, Ukraine’s leadership has continued to frame the accession process as a national priority, suggesting that the transformative potential of EU membership remains central to the country’s post-war vision.

Scenarios for the next years

As of 2025, Ukraine’s accession to the European Union has gained historic momentum. However, the future remains uncertain. Multiple scenarios—ranging from gradual integration to political deadlock—are possible, each contingent on the outcome of the war, the reform trajectory, and political will in both Kyiv and Brussels.

1. Gradual Integration under Conditional Progress In this scenario, negotiations proceed incrementally, structured around thematic clusters and benchmarks. Ukraine continues implementing institutional reforms, focusing on the rule of law, judicial independence, anti-corruption, and administrative capacity. The EU, for its part, supports this process through pre-accession assistance and capacity-building instruments. This model mirrors the approach taken with Western Balkan countries, with one key distinction: Ukraine’s geopolitical salience. The war has generated a sense of urgency that has, to some extent, overruled the EU’s traditional enlargement fatigue (Youngs and Zuleeg 2023). However, the momentum may slow as attention shifts and enlargement-sceptic member states regain influence.

2. Stalled Progress due to Internal and External Factors Despite initial enthusiasm, another plausible scenario could see a stagnation of talks. Structural challenges in Ukraine—such as oligarchic influence, a weak rule of law in certain regions, and administrative overload due to the war—could hamper reform implementation. On the EU side, political resistance is mounting. In particular, Hungary has consistently obstructed consensus within the European Council, delaying financial aid and voicing objections to Ukraine’s fast-track integration (Politico 2024). Furthermore, the outcome of the war will be decisive. A prolonged conflict—or a frozen frontline—could complicate Ukraine’s eligibility, as the EU remains cautious about importing unresolved territorial disputes. This risk is compounded by questions over how Ukraine’s accession would impact the EU’s own institutional functioning and budgetary structure, given Ukraine’s size and needs.

3. Political Breakthrough and Accelerated Accession A third, more optimistic scenario envisions a breakthrough that enables faster-than-expected accession. This would require a decisive Ukrainian victory, further reform milestones, and a shift in EU political leadership favouring enlargement. Under such conditions, Ukraine could join the Union within the next decade. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has stated that Ukraine could join the EU “before 2030,” though some remain sceptical. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, for example, has insisted that membership would not be possible before 2034 and that Ukraine’s reconstruction will probably affect the EU in the long-term from a financial point of view (Reuters).

4. Institutional Fatigue or Political Reversal Finally, the possibility of regression or reversal cannot be neglected. A change in EU leadership toward more protectionist or populist tendencies could deprioritize enlargement. Alternatively, domestic fatigue or a change in Ukrainian leadership could slow reforms, undermining the accession drive. In either case, formal negotiations may continue without real progress, creating a symbolic but ineffective process—similar to what has occurred with Türkiye.

In sum, Ukraine’s accession path remains open but contingent. While the war has undeniably accelerated the political willingness to engage with Ukraine, the process will depend on sustained reform, the resolution of the conflict, and the capacity of the EU to absorb a large, post-conflict state. The stakes are high not only for Ukraine’s future but for the credibility of the EU’s geopolitical ambitions.

Conclusion

Ukraine’s path towards EU accession is unique in modern European history: it unfolds not in a moment of peace and consolidation, but amid a full-scale war that tests both Ukraine’s resilience and the EU’s capacity for geopolitical leadership. The accession process cannot be untied from the battlefield. The outcome of the war with Russia will ultimately determine whether integration is feasible, sustainable, and credible. For the European Union, the stakes are extraordinarily high. Ukraine offers substantial economic benefits through its agricultural and technological potential, as well as critical raw materials essential for the green and digital transitions. Its membership would also send a powerful symbolic signal, reaffirming the EU’s commitment to democracy and sovereignty against authoritarian aggression. Yet these opportunities are counterbalanced by the immense financial, institutional, and security challenges that integration would entail. Absorbing a large, war-damaged country into the Union would require budgetary rebalancing, deep institutional reforms, and unprecedented investments in reconstruction and border security. For Ukraine, the promise of EU accession represents both an anchor and a horizon: an anchor against Russian coercion and domestic backsliding, and a horizon for reconstruction, modernization, and societal transformation. Public support for membership, currently at record highs, underscores the degree to which EU integration has become synonymous with Ukraine’s vision of its future. But this enthusiasm must withstand the inevitable frustrations of a long and demanding process. Ultimately, the EU’s decision will test its own strategic identity. Enlargement has always been both a technical process and a political choice. Ukraine’s case intensifies this duality: to admit Ukraine is not only to expand the Union’s territory and population but to redefine the EU as a geopolitical actor prepared to assume new burdens in exchange for deeper credibility and influence. The choice is thus not merely about Ukraine’s future inside Europe, but about Europe’s future in a contested world.

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