Managing Interferences: The Russian Challenge to Europe’s Stability

Context and Introduction

When the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine on three fronts on February 24, 2022, the entire world was left petrified, not only because of the military operation itself and the grave violation of international law it entailed, but also because it exposed the fragility of a system that had been faltering for years despite every effort to preserve it.

To understand President Vladimir Putin’s strategies and the means through which he pursues his neoimperialist policy, one must take a step back and examine how Russian disinformation has long played a key role in this affair, a phenomenon that, to this day, the international community still struggles to confront effectively. Even Trump, who has always shown a certain fascination with the Russian leader, is said to have grown irritated after a lengthy sermon from his counterpart during the summit held between the two in Alaska on August 15, 2025, in which Putin presented alleged historical evidence supporting the thesis of “Russia and Ukraine as one people and one territory.”

The former KGB agent, a skilled orator and master of persuasion, is enthralled by the ideal of a great Russia that he seeks to emulate and restore. To achieve this, he draws on carefully manipulated historical sources aimed at depicting an age-old and perpetual clash between the West and his country. The authors and works he cites are always the same, and there is a clear tendency to portray Russian writers as a collective rather than as individuals, evidence of his effort to justify a supposed unity of peoples. Alongside these more theoretical arguments (the foundation of the government’s propaganda machine) come concrete acts of political, economic, and military destabilization.

Ukraine, the most striking example, surrendered its 1,900 nuclear warheads to Russia under the Budapest Memorandum (December 5, 1994), seeking to secure peace and territorial recognition, at least on paper. Following deep political instability in Ukraine, caused by the clash between pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych and the anti-government opposition over his decision to suspend trade and association talks with the European Union (the so-called Euromaidan), Russian troops entered Crimea in February 2014. A referendum held on March 16, 2014, unrecognized internationally, formally declared the peninsula’s transfer from Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

Despite harsh criticism and sanctions, the West ultimately sought to stabilize a situation that had become irreversibly compromised, effectively conceding the occupied territories to Russia and focusing instead on securing an immediate ceasefire through the Minsk Protocol. The hope of having permanently curbed Putin’s expansionist ambitions faded with the war that, for more than three years now, has devastated the Ukrainian people and still shows no sign of ending, despite international efforts on multiple fronts. The neo-imperialist ambitions of the Kremlin’s occupant include, at the very least, the complete occupation of the Donbas—a scenario that remains difficult to achieve today, given Ukraine’s extraordinary resistance.

The conflict thus advances swiftly into its fourth year, regardless of the fact that the International Criminal Court has, for over two and a half years, issued an international arrest warrant against him for war crimes, confirmed by numerous agencies and ranging from the abduction of children to the indiscriminate killing of civilians, the use of chemical weapons, and the torture of prisoners. The case of journalist Victoria Roshchyna is emblematic in this regard.

Meanwhile, the propaganda machine continues its work, particularly in European countries where skepticism about continuing military support for Ukraine is strongest, and prominent figures indulge in provocative remarks, such as those made by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova following the collapse of the Torre dei Conti in Rome. The direct attack is also aimed at the transatlantic alliance, which is accused of deliberately expanding eastward at Russia’s expense and thus threatening its security. NATO has therefore developed a system to combat informational threats, those aimed at causing internal fragmentation, which have increased significantly following the illegal occupation of Crimea. To counter these threats, it relies on strong cooperation with the EU, G7, UN, and OECD, as well as, naturally, among the member states of the alliance and its partners. Finally, the Kremlin’s focus remains on discrediting its opponents, often through misleading narratives, such as the accusation of Nazism directed at the Zelensky government.

Russian Interference

One of the main tools used by Putin is the attempt to change the political orientations of countries once under Soviet influence and nowadays staunch supporters of pro-Western positions.

Moldova is among the countries that have suffered the most from Russian interference but, despite this, thanks to votes from the diaspora, it has managed to embark on a clear path toward closer integration with the European Union and the democratic ideals that define it. Outgoing President Maia Sandu secured support for a second term, and the referendum aimed at ensuring the “irreversibility of Moldova’s European path” was approved. This occurred despite international observers reporting external interference (particularly from Russia) and vote-buying, with social media campaigns marked by disinformation and manipulation. The pro-EU trend was further confirmed in the parliamentary elections of September 28, 2025, with Sandu’s party, PAS, leading with over 50% of the votes, a decisive victory despite additional Russian meddling attempts uncovered by the BBC, involving a secret network that offered payments to participants who shared pro-Russian propaganda and fake news.

Georgia is driven by a strong pro-European spirit, which has led to ongoing protests across the country following the parliamentary elections of October 26, 2024, won by the pro-Russian party Georgian Dream, accused of being responsible for significant irregularities in the voting process. While the European Parliament has expressed particular skepticism and called for early elections, the Georgian people continue to demonstrate, and the opposition is boycotting the local elections. However, the policies pursued by the current government have resulted in the suspension of the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration prospects.

Romania was at the center of global political and geopolitical debate during the intense election campaign that led to the victory of pro-EU centrist Nicuşor Dan. The rather tumultuous period was first marked by a surprising first-round win by far-right populist Georgescu, followed by his exclusion from the presidential runoff. The Romanian Constitutional Court annulled the first round after intelligence services revealed that Russia had supported the candidate on TikTok by creating roughly 800 fake accounts.

Belarus represents a unique and atypical context compared to the previously analysed countries. Under Lukashenko’s leadership, the Belarusian state has depended on Russia for 31 years. However, a growing crisis and widespread public discontent, undermining political stability and epitomized by a symbolic emergency linked to a shortage of potatoes, are pushing the Belarusian dictator to reestablish ties with Western countries, albeit while remaining strongly aligned with Putin and still accused by the opposition of mere opportunism. A telling example is the release of several prisoners (including Sergei Tikhanovsky, opposition leader and husband of fellow leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya) in exchange for relief from sanctions. This is a peculiar situation, being a sign of a weakening Russia and of the lack of clarity and coherence in Western policies.

Dealing with Allies

Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary and Robert Fico’s in Slovakia have emerged as internal pro-Russian outliers that complicate EU unity in the face of Kremlin aggression. Orbán in particular has long been Moscow’s closest friend within the EU, as Hungary has opposed many EU initiatives to support Ukraine and remains heavily reliant on Russian oil and gas imports. In July 2024, Orbán even met with Vladimir Putin in Moscow, pointedly reaffirming Hungary’s commitment to its bilateral ties with Russia despite the war. Budapest is seen as a likely veto against key decisions like opening EU accession talks with Ukraine, which require unanimity. Orbán’s obstructionism forces the EU to expend political capital on coaxing or circumventing Hungary, for example, Brussels has dangled billions in frozen funds to win Orbán’s assent on Ukraine aid and enlargement matters. This dynamic undermines the appearance of a coherent European front.

In Slovakia, Robert Fico’s return to power in 2023 has similarly undercut EU cohesion. Fico rose on a stridently pro-Russian, anti-sanctions platform, and since taking office he halted Slovakia’s military aid to Ukraine and openly questioned EU sanctions on Russia. He argues that Europe should push for a quick peace instead of Russia’s defeat, infamously calling the war “senseless Slavs killing each other”. Fico has even vowed to block Ukraine’s NATO membership bid, bragging that Slovakia’s consent would never be given. The two governments jointly opposed EU plans to phase out Russian energy imports, claiming such moves would harm their economies: Fico declared that “no one should tell us where to buy oil and gas”, and Orbán railed that “the European Union has become a war project” by cutting off Russian fuel. Indeed, Hungary and Slovakia remain among the few EU states still importing Russian oil and gas under exemptions, paying Moscow hundreds of millions of euros each month, a dependence the Kremlin can exploit to divide Europe.

Together, these holdouts pose a serious challenge to a unified EU foreign and security policy. The EU operates largely by consensus in external affairs, which gives such dissenters outsized leverage. While 25 or more member states may agree on robust support for Ukraine, a single holdout can water down or delay joint actions. For instance, Hungary’s objections have repeatedly slowed the EU’s sanctions packages and aid pledges, necessitating work-arounds like “coalitions of the willing” outside EU structures. These internal divisions are exactly what the Kremlin seeks to foment. Moscow courts sympathetic European politicians and parties to fragment the West’s resolve, and often finds receptive partners. European leaders have acknowledged that “the EU has an Orbán problem,” as one analysis bluntly put it. Creative diplomacy has been used to circumvent vetoes (as seen when other leaders briefly asked Orban to leave the room in order to green-light Ukraine’s EU candidacy). There is also renewed discussion about reforming decision-making processes for foreign policy, to avoid single-state holdouts. In the end, a few dissenting capitals cannot be allowed to hijack Europe’s response to Russian aggression.

Dealing with the States

Across the Atlantic, the United States’ posture has shifted with the return of President Donald Trump to office. Trump’s approach to Russia and European security marks a departure from the previous administration’s. He has exhibited a personal fascination or at least respect for Vladimir Putin, often downplaying Russia’s culpability in the Ukraine conflict and emphasizing his own ability to broker peace. Throughout his campaign and into his new term, Trump insisted he could end the war in Ukraine “within 24 hours,” suggesting he would bring both sides to the table and strike a deal quickly, even if that might come at the cost of Ukrainian territorial concessions. In practice, this “peace at any price” inclination has translated into an American policy less focused on military aid and more on pushing for immediate ceasefire negotiations. Over the past year, Washington’s arms deliveries to Kyiv have slowed and been made conditional on progress toward talks. President Trump has also broken with European allies on the diplomatic front, when, for example, his administration opened direct lines to Belarus’s authoritarian leader, Alexander Lukashenko, to discuss a potential end to the conflict. This occurred despite Europe’s policy of isolating Lukashenko for his role in aiding Russia and repressing his own people. Trump’s willingness to engage such figures stems from his transactional view of foreign policy, he prioritizes striking deals and ending conflicts over the promotion of democratic values.

At the same time, Trump has revived his longstanding aversion to multilateral institutions. He has publicly cast doubt on the United States’ commitment to NATO, warning that America might not defend NATO allies who “don’t pay” enough into the alliance. These comments caused consternation in European capitals, as they strike at the heart of the treaty’s defense guarantee. Trump’s skepticism extends to the European Union as well. He has previously characterized the EU as a competitor and was notably hostile to various EU initiatives during his first term. Now, in his second term, European officials sense a U.S. disengagement from the traditional leadership role it played in countering Kremlin aggression. This new reality forces Europe to contemplate how to protect its own interests and uphold support for Ukraine if U.S. policy diverges significantly from Europe’s.

With at least three more years of the current U.S. administration ahead, European policymakers are recalibrating their strategy to manage the transatlantic relationship and keep support for Ukraine on track. A first priority is to bolster Europe’s autonomous capacity for action. NATO’s European members have already accelerated defense spending and joint initiatives, spurred in part by uncertainty over U.S. commitments. EU governments are investing in expanding ammunition stockpiles, upgrading military infrastructure on the eastern flank, and coordinating weapons development projects. The message is that Europe will take greater responsibility for its own security. This build up not only prepares the EU to shoulder more of the burden in Ukraine’s defense if needed, but also aims to signal to Washington that the alliance’s European pillar is strengthening.

Possible Solutions

Europe’s capacity to respond to Russian interference depends on its ability to transform the lessons learned since the beginning of the conflict into policy. The EU should strengthen enforcement of the Digital Services Act to curb online disinformation and ensure platforms take responsibility for malicious content. Coordinated pressure on social media companies to remove state-linked propaganda networks must be paired with real-time monitoring and accountability mechanisms. At the same time, public education on digital literacy and disinformation awareness must be expanded, both through school curricula and adult-targeted outreach, especially in states most exposed to foreign influence. Election integrity must also be reinforced through enhanced observation missions, cybersecurity audits, and tighter rules on campaign financing and foreign influence. Member states should adopt common standards for digital transparency and expand electoral resilience measures, with support from EU institutions and partnerships with the OSCE. Safeguarding the 2029 European elections and upcoming national votes in vulnerable regions requires vigilance now, with increased information sharing and institutional preparedness.

Support for Ukraine and other candidate countries such as Moldova and Georgia remains strategically essential. Beyond symbolic commitments, the EU should sustain financial assistance, embed reform advisors in ministries, and accelerate partial integration into EU programs, especially in infrastructure, energy, and trade. Enlargement must be depoliticized and defended against internal veto threats. Making tangible progress in negotiations sends a strong message that democratic reforms will be rewarded, while delaying only empowers Russia’s narrative of Western fatigue. Energy independence must also remain a top priority. While the EU has significantly reduced its reliance on Russian oil and gas, full disengagement is still pending. Loopholes, particularly in pipeline deliveries and LNG shipments, must be closed through binding legislation and alternative supply development. Strategic investments in renewables, energy efficiency, and trans-border infrastructure will secure Europe’s autonomy, while depriving Moscow of crucial export revenues used to fund aggression and manipulation. Military assistance to Ukraine must be institutionalized and sustained, with or without active U.S. leadership. A coalition of willing EU and NATO members should formalize joint procurement mechanisms, training programs, and long-term commitments to defense support. Contingency planning for reduced American involvement must include increased European defense budgets and clearer security guarantees.

It is crucial to remember that there are approximately €210 billion worth of frozen Russian assets in Europe. The political debate, once more vigorous and intense in its early stages, has gradually faded. Yet, the immobilized assets and funds remain effectively under the control of European institutions. These institutions should therefore conduct a thorough political analysis and then make a firm and unanimous decision on the potential use of these resources. Energy, strengthening the EU’s presence in the eastern countries of the Old Continent, investments, defense, and support to Ukraine during wartime and later in reconstruction, are all possible areas of allocation.

These resources could also be used as a bargaining tool to help bring an end to the Russia–Ukraine conflict; indeed, there is a risk that Russia may use this as a pretext to continue hostilities, or that the EU might alienate Trump, who, as discussed, is determined to end the war, zwhatever it takes.

Finally, legal and institutional protections against foreign interference must be modernized. Political finance laws should be harmonized across the EU, including foreign donor disclosure requirements and controls on third-party media funding. Intelligence services need stronger mandates, information-sharing tools, and oversight frameworks to detect and respond to covert influence. An expanded EU-wide rapid alert mechanism could link national authorities with Brussels-based analysts in real time. Cumulatively, these efforts will form a more robust European shield against the Kremlin’s multifaceted strategy of subversion, allowing Europe to proactively defend its democratic institutions rather than merely react to their erosion.

Final Remarks and Conclusion

Russia’s ongoing political interference in Europe, through propaganda, energy blackmail, illicit funding, and the cultivation of anti-EU actors, represents a multidimensional threat to European democracy and security. While the Kremlin’s war on Ukraine is the most blatant assault, the subtler campaign to undermine Europe from within could, if unchecked, be just as dangerous in the long run. Yet Europe is far from helpless. Indeed, one clear finding is that the EU possesses significant tools and collective influence, from regulatory power, to economic might, to the combined weight of its diplomatic and military efforts. The challenge is to deploy all these instruments in a coherent way before it’s too late.

Time is of the essence. The next few years will likely be pivotal for the war in Ukraine and for the resilience of European institutions. There is a genuine urgency for a coherent European strategy, as fragmented measures will not suffice against a Russian state mobilizing all levers of hybrid warfare. This will require political will at the highest levels. It means confronting uncomfortable issues, calling out member states that stray from common positions or investing money and political capital in parts of Europe that some would prefer to ignore. The credibility of the EU and the health of its democracies demand no less of an effort.

Ultimately, what is at stake is not just the outcome of the war in Ukraine, but the long-term stability of the European project itself. The Kremlin’s interference seeks to corrode the ideals of liberal democracy, pluralism, and rule of law that underpin the EU. Europe’s answer, therefore, must be to double-down on those very ideals.

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