Freedom of Navigation as Statecraft: EU Presence at Maritime Chokepoints

The context: introducing the EU naval strategy

Over the past decade the EU has shifted from an episodic crisis-response model toward a more sustained naval presence in key chokepoints. The 2023 revision of the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) reflects this shift: it explicitly stresses protecting “maritime shipping routes free and open” and upholding international law, in particular UNCLOS, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as core EU interests. The updated strategy calls for “stepping up activities at sea”, such as organising joint naval exercises and coordinating member-state naval and air assets in new “maritime areas of interest” via the Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP) concept. It also underscores civil–military integration, for example, by enhancing maritime domain awareness through information sharing among civilian and military authorities on networks like CISE and MARSUR.

This regularised presence becomes a tool of statecraft. Frequent port calls and liaison exchanges establish partnership with coastal states, while public reporting of activities reinforces transparency. In effect, a steady EU naval presence conveys commitment and reassurance, signalling that violations (of UNCLOS or free navigation) will be noted and addressed. As the EUMSS puts it, the EU now aims to “act promptly and effectively in the maritime domain” using all relevant civilian and military instruments. In practice this means partnerships (with NATO, UN, regional bodies) and a layered presence, from civilian observers to CSDP naval operations, that together uphold freedom of navigation as a policy goal.

Operation Aspides in the Red Sea

In February 2024 the EU launched Operation Aspides, a defensive CSDP naval mission to escort shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb and adjacent waters. Mandated by the Foreign Affairs Council and UN Security Council resolutions, Aspides’ sole objective is to “safeguard freedom of navigation” amid the Red Sea crisis. The deployment, currently amounting to four frigates plus airborne surveillance, covers the Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden and even up to the Strait of Hormuz, with a self-imposed limit just south of Oman. Rules of engagement are strictly defensive, as EU ships escort merchant vessels under attack, use proportionate self-defence if necessary, and respect UNCLOS transit rights and coastal-state sovereignty.

The mission “seeks to mitigate risks, not neutralize them”, as Borrell and analysts note. By concentrating on protection and awareness, the EU avoids mission creep into offensive strikes (unlike the US-led Prosperity Guardian). This posture builds diplomatic leverage, with steady coalitions of EU states cooperating with partners to reassure littoral states like Djibouti, Sudan and Yemen that commercial shipping will flow. As a senior Yemeni official remarked, EU navies aim to “demonstrate [their] commitment to defending freedom of navigation and an international rules-based order” while developing trust with regional actors. Aspides’ regular, multinational escort activities constitute a strong EU signal of solidarity and reliability amid Red Sea uncertainty.

The EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presences

Parallel to Aspides, the EU has established a Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) for the northwestern Indian Ocean and Strait of Hormuz. Unlike an executive CSDP operation, a CMP is not a standalone EU command. It is a voluntary coordination framework, where member states deploy naval or air units under their own national command, while a small EU coordination cell (MAICC) synchronises them. Assets remain under national control, but CMP ensures continuity and shared awareness. Through the MAICC and tools like the MARSUR network, participating navies exchange intelligence and build a common maritime picture. A designated EU “Senior Coordinator” liaises with regional partners to link CMP activities to local frameworks.

Here too the patrols are well-defined, mostly rotating through the Gulf of Oman, coordinated port visits (e.g. joint exercises with India or Oman), and observers aboard each other’s ships. Because the EU designates the area as a Maritime Area of Interest, planners can “step up” or “step down” presence as needed, adding more ships during crises or maintaining a single-ship foothold in calmer times. The EU thus signals resolve to maintain open sea lanes in Hormuz and the NW Indian Ocean but does so by pooling contributions rather than declaring a new warship mission.

In the Gulf of Guinea the EU’s CMP complements long-standing African-led efforts, especially the “Yaoundé process” of ECOWAS/ECCAS states. Launched as a pilot in January 2021, the initiative works alongside the EU’s region-wide maritime strategy and development aid. The CMP in this area is explicitly designed to support coastal states’ initiatives and contribute to the Yaoundé maritime security architecture, rather than replacing it. EU navies contribute ships and training on a rolling basis, and these assets participate in large multilateral exercises and invite local navies to observe operations.

Crucially, the EU emphasizes capacity building and information exchange. EU-supported platforms like YARIS (Yaoundé Information Sharing System) enable real-time data sharing among West African maritime centers and EU vessels. The EU also funds workshops, logistics training teams, and simulation exercises to help coastal states plan joint responses. For example, a recent Spanish-led logistics course in Benin trained local forces to maintain their own naval base, and a €4.5 million CRIMGO project has been fostering inter-agency information sharing networks in West Africa. By building local ownership of security, and regularly exercising together, the EU cultivates trust with Gulf of Guinea partners. As one briefing notes, these exercises have been “very well received” by regional navies and are explicitly lauded in EU Council conclusions. A permanent EU maritime presence in the Gulf of Guinea strengthens African counter-piracy efforts without any heavy handed imposition. It opens channels for EU navies to assist when needed, but always on the basis of partnership and respect for regional leadership

The EU Naval Strategy: Risks and Safeguards

The European Union’s commitment to ensuring freedom of navigation and integrating the policies of its Member States and allies in this field may face risks that, if not properly contained and addressed, could undermine the stability of the system and drastically slow the effectiveness of European initiatives.

The objective is to establish limits and safeguards to be maintained in order to avoid losing credibility or even triggering open conflicts.

One of the foremost and most complex challenges lies in the unintended expansion of mandates—actions that undermine previously established diplomatic agreements and jeopardize their validity, thereby deteriorating relations among partner countries and potentially causing escalation. The situation becomes even more delicate in today’s context of cyber and hybrid attacks, where an excessive or misinterpreted response may lead to violations of international law and the rule of law.

Hence, it becomes necessary to identify and propose guarantees to safeguard maritime diplomacy.

The European Union is moving to strengthen strategic partnerships with both civilian and military entities. Ongoing dialogue and close cooperation with NATO aim to conduct exercises that train and prepare European forces to respond to potential attacks, while ensuring a more stable presence in relevant waters, with the purpose of enhancing deterrence and credibility before the international community.

Having troops and vessels capable of effective reaction helps overcome additional challenges such as ambiguous messaging, inadvertent escalation, and partner misperception, while also increasing efficiency and reducing resource strain.

By acting in this manner, military capabilities could be strengthened while simultaneously benefiting the environment. Indeed, the objectives of European navigation policies are also linked to environmental protection: the maritime basins surrounding the EU contain large quantities of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and chemical weapons dating back to the First and Second World Wars, as well as naval mines recently laid by the Russian Federation in the Black Sea. Strategic cooperation with partners would further help safeguard a system already strained by marine pollution, depletion of fish stocks, and loss of biodiversity—while also supporting the Ukrainian cause.

It is also essential to deepen and reinforce partnerships with likeminded countries, regional and international organisations, following the model of NATO and United Nations agreements. Stable relations foster greater trust; greater trust, in turn, translates into a stronger international presence and a primary geopolitical position. Among other goals, the EU also aims at deploying EU liaison officers to maritime information centres in non-EU countries.

Joining forces would thus help improve civilian knowledge and skills, effectively making the wider population better prepared to respond—particularly to acts of sabotage targeting gas pipelines, currently the most critical and fragile infrastructure for the European continent.

It is crucial to recall the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE), an action plan promoted by European authorities to improve information exchange among public authorities. The sharing of information among Member States seeks to build a bridge that encourages more effective cooperation and, consequently, reinforces European identity and unity.

By adding to the unified lines of communication between national capitals and Brussels a commitment to periodically review mandates and define deconfliction levels and pre-established contact chains, it would finally be possible to transform the perception of risk into one of assurance.

Measuring Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the measures should not be assessed on the basis of battles won, but rather in terms of stability and cooperation. Maintaining diplomatic order would hardly give rise to such battles; instead, it would promote valuable progress in the application of international law.

The evaluation of these measures revolves around four main pillars:

1. Fewer hazardous interactions at sea;

2. Faster deconfliction cycles;

3. Wider uptake of shared mechanisms;

4. Standardised reporting formats by partners.

The evidence of linkage between operations and politics — such as briefings feeding into regional dialogues and envoy follow-ups — would attest to the success of the plan. After all, numerous proposals have already been endorsed by the European Commission, the European External Action Service, and the Council of the European Union, and some results can already be observed, or at least begin to emerge. One need only consider the increasingly close cooperation with NATO, with Secretary-General Mark Rutte at the forefront in defending European interests and seeking to align them with those of the United States.

Maximizing efficiency: possible solutions

Coordination and mutual trust must serve as the key principles guiding the European Union’s action in the field of navigation policies. Establishing solid and cooperative relationships with its partners ensures that the EU maintains a strong position in the maritime domain — a domain that carries significant military, environmental, and economic weight.

Alongside the two previously mentioned issues, it is crucial to recall that more than 80% of global trade is seaborne, about two-thirds of the world’s oil and gas supply is either extracted at sea or transported by sea, and up to 99% of international data transfers and communications take place through submarine cables — over 400 such cables extending across 1.3 million kilometres — as reported by the European External Action Service.

The global economy runs on water, and the EU must implement appropriate policies to assert a leading role in this regard. To strengthen trust with its partners, it will be necessary to tie deployment rhythms to standing maritime security dialogues with key coastal partners (for example, structured EU–GCC tracks) with clearly designated focal points. It would also be useful to institutionalise joint legal seminars on innocent and transit passage, as well as incident deconfliction, in cooperation with regional authorities and naval forces.

Standardising deconfliction protocols — defining who contacts whom, at what level, and how frequently — and making generic versions public to set expectations, while expanding observer invitations and liaison exchanges aboard EU vessels and harmonising reporting templates across theatres, will in turn constitute key steps toward finalising a European navigation policy capable of exerting real influence, positioning the EU as a guarantor of a recognised and respected rule-based system.

Bibliography

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• Bundeswehr (German Ministry of Defense) (2024). Red Sea – EUNAVFOR Aspides(official operation brief).

• Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2024). “Operation Aspides, or the Peril of Low Expectations in Yemen” (analysis, 20 Nov 2024).

• International Institute for Strategic Studies (2025). Deep waters: the maritime security landscape in the Gulf of Guinea (EUISS Brief, 9 Jan 2025).

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• European Commission. Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE)