Caught in the Middle: Europe’s Dilemma in the Iran War

Introduction

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched large-scale strikes across Iran in what the Pentagon labelled “Operation Epic Fury”, targeting the residence of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and key nuclear infrastructure. Most European capitals learned of the operation largely through the news. Once again, a major military intervention had been launched in Europe’s neighbourhood largely without consultation, without warning, and with an implicit expectation of European support (Matthijs, 2026).

The reaction from Brussels was telling. A joint statement by Commission President von der Leyen and Council President Costa called the developments “greatly concerning”, a formulation so cautious it bordered on meaningless (European Council, 2026). Meanwhile, oil prices surged past $100 a barrel, the Strait of Hormuz got to a standstill, and European gas prices spiked by over 50% within weeks (Al Jazeera/Reuters, 2026; Ventura, 2026).The economic shockwaves were immediate while the political response was not.

This is not a new story. The Iran war has once again laid bare the EU’s defining foreign policy dilemma, significant economic exposure combined with marginal political agency. Caught between an unpredictable Washington, an Islamic fundamentalist regime in Tehran, and a divided membership, the European Union risks paying the price of a war it did not start while watching others write the peace.

Background

All events may unfold for a reason, yet what is currently taking place in the Middle East is the result of a long sequence of actions, ideas, and positions shaped by both local and external actors. Within this geopolitical framework, the European Union has consistently sought to promote conciliatory approaches, aligned with United Nations principles and aimed at mitigating tensions among the parties. It has positioned itself as a proponent of dialogue, firm in its principles, yet willing to rely on international law as the primary instrument for resolving international disputes.

Recent tensions are deeply rooted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, concluded on 14 July 2015 by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the High Representative of the European Union, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 of 2015 (United Nations Security Council, 2015), the agreement established a highly delicate framework, one inherently prone to instability, yet it was widely regarded as a successful example of global diplomacy, capable of fostering engagement rather than provoking confrontation.

Under the terms of the agreement, the European Union committed to the gradual lifting and eventual removal of sanctions against Iran in exchange for limitations on its uranium enrichment activities. The overarching objective, shared by participating states and the United Nations, was to prevent nuclear proliferation and to ensure that nuclear energy remained confined to civilian purposes.

However, this far reaching diplomatic effort ultimately proved unsustainable. A decisive turning point came with the withdrawal of the United States under President Donald Trump in 2018, marking a clear shift toward a more confrontational stance vis à vis the Iranian regime. This was followed by Iran’s progressive non compliance with the agreed terms, ultimately leading to the reinstatement of the full spectrum of sanctions that had been lifted in 2016. On 28 September 2025, the United Nations Security Council reimposed sanctions, followed the next day by the European Council, which confirmed additional restrictive measures (European Council).

Relations between Western actors and Iran, already strained by the gradual erosion of the agreement, were further exacerbated by targeted military operations, most notably the killing of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in Baghdad on 3 January 2020, carried out on the orders of President Trump.

A significant rupture in the diplomatic framework occurred with the so-called Twelve Day War, during which Israel and the United States engaged in coordinated military action aimed at degrading Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure. Operations such as Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer culminated in a ceasefire that only temporarily halted hostilities, while underlying tensions remained unresolved (Financial Times, 2026; Al Jazeera, 2026).

By the end of 2025, amid currency collapse, soaring inflation, and the deterioration of public services, widespread protests erupted across Tehran and other major Iranian cities, with citizens calling for the end of the Islamic Republic. The regime responded with large-scale repression, drawing sharp criticism from the international community. After days of signaling support for civilian protesters, President Trump launched Operation Epic Fury on 28 February 2026, resulting in the immediate elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and, in the following days, several high ranking figures within the regime (Al Jazeera, 2026).

Despite the intensity of the campaign and Tehran’s limited capacity to respond effectively, the United States encountered significant strategic constraints when the Strait of Hormuz, through which in 2025 approximately 15 million barrels per day of crude oil and 5 million barrels per day of refined petroleum products transited, was blocked by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2026). This development triggered a global energy crisis and prompted European leaders to distance themselves from Washington’s approach.

At present, following a fragile ceasefire and amid persistent uncertainty regarding the near future, the European Union appears unable to assert its interests effectively within ongoing negotiations, remaining largely confined to a reactive role and intervening only once agreements have already been reached.

EU‘s current response flawed by ambiguity

The European Union’s response currently appears fragile, uncertain, and blurred. It is difficult to identify a clear strategic direction, and the Union can best be described as being stuck in the middle. On the one hand, aligning with Iran is not a viable option, given the ongoing repression, violations of international agreements, restrictions on global trade and economic flows, and the longstanding hostility of Tehran and its allies toward the West. On the other hand, the United States under President Trump has repeatedly issued highly confrontational statements toward European leaders and countries, including those traditionally considered close allies (Corriere della Sera, 2026), while acting unilaterally, often without consulting its established partners and in ways that raise serious concerns regarding compliance with international law. Diplomatic engagement has increasingly been replaced by aggressive public communication, reflecting an approach to international relations that diverges significantly from European diplomatic traditions.

The European Union, having relied for decades on the United States for both military and, to a certain extent, economic support, now finds itself structurally constrained and unable to implement concrete and effective policies. This limitation is rooted in long standing structural challenges that have become increasingly difficult to overcome.

The Union’s energy policy provides a clear illustration of this vulnerability. European energy systems remain heavily dependent on imports, a condition that has already been exposed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and further exacerbated by insufficient investment in alternative sources, particularly nuclear energy. As highlighted by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the Nuclear Energy Summit, “This reduction in the share of nuclear energy was a choice. I believe that it was a strategic mistake for Europe to turn its back on a reliable, affordable source of low emissions power” (European Commission, 2026).

Despite efforts to diversify energy sources following previous crises, Europe remains structurally vulnerable to shocks originating in the Gulf region. In response, policymakers have relied primarily on short term mitigation tools, including the use of strategic reserves, demand reduction measures, and emergency fiscal interventions, rather than addressing the underlying geopolitical drivers of this vulnerability.

At the same time, the European Union risks undermining the progress achieved in recent years through its coordinated maritime presences, revealing its limited capacity to defend its strategic interests through direct engagement. European leaders have repeatedly emphasized that the priority remains the stabilization of the region before any form of operational involvement, suggesting that future actions would focus primarily on defensive measures aimed at ensuring safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz (Ansa English, 2026).

Taken together, these dynamics illustrate a broader structural paradox. The European Union is highly exposed to the consequences of the conflict, yet marginal in shaping its trajectory. This gap between exposure and agency underpins the Union’s ambiguous response, one that prioritizes caution over influence and risk management over strategic direction. As the conflict evolves, such ambiguity risks entrenching a pattern of reactive engagement, limiting the EU’s ability to act as a credible geopolitical actor.

Scenarios for the EU‘s path forward

The Iran war has placed the European Union once again at a crossroads. Its response to the conflict or lack thereof will shape not only its standing in the Middle East, but the Union’s credibility as a geopolitical actor globally. A bloc that built its international identity on multilateralism and the rules-based order has so far failed to translate that identity into meaningful action. Will the EU remain on the sidelines? Will it find agency through coalitions, carving out a functional role short of full engagement? Or will the crisis finally deliver the strategic autonomy European leaders have long promised but rarely pursued? Looking ahead, four scenarios illustrate how the EU’s role in and after the Iran war could unfold:

„Strategic spectator“ - Status quo deepens

A very likely scenario, at least in the short term, is that the EU continues to stay on the sidelines: being diplomatically cautious, militarily absent, and institutionally paralyzed by internal division. This pattern is already visible. After a meeting with EU foreign ministers in Brussels, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas acknowledged there had been “no appetite” for expanding the EU’s naval presence into the Gulf (Al Jazeera/Reuters, 2026).German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius bluntly stated “This is not our war. We have not started it” (Al Jazeera/Reuters, 2026).That a Defence Minister’s most compelling argument against engagement is simply that Europe did not fire the first shot speaks volumes, not just about this conflict, but about the EU’s broader inability to translate exposure into agency.

Should this trajectory continue, the EU would find itself managing consequences rather than shaping outcomes. In practical terms, this would mean absorbing ongoing energy price shocks through emergency measures like windfall taxes, strategic reserve releases, demand reduction targets, without addressing the underlying vulnerability. Diplomatically, Brussels would continue issuing calls for de-escalation and ceasefire that carry no enforcement mechanism and command no audience. Internal disagreements between member states would prevent any unanimous position from emerging, leaving the EU’s formal statements as precisely that, statements, not policy. A post-conflict settlement, whenever it comes, would likely be brokered by others: the United States, China, or regional actors with Europe at best an observer at the table.

The risks of this scenario are significant and cumulative. As analyst Nathalie Tocci has argued, Europe’s ambiguity amounts to “another nail in the coffin of our credibility”, damaging the reputation of a bloc whose international identity is anchored on the rule of law and effective multilateralism (Tocci, 2026). Each crisis in which Europe watches from the sidelines makes the next one harder to reverse and the strategic spectator, over time, risks becoming permanent.

Functional multilateralism

A more pragmatic pathway for the European Union lies in what can be described as functional multilateralism, a form of flexible, issue specific cooperation among a limited number of actors aimed at addressing concrete challenges rather than pursuing comprehensive geopolitical strategies. In the context of the Iran war, this approach would allow the EU to move beyond rhetorical positioning and engage in targeted, operational initiatives where its interests are most directly at stake.

The European Union is not unfamiliar with initiatives aimed at safeguarding its interests through joint maritime operations, leveraging its existing instruments to protect collective priorities. At the same time, in line with the principles of international law, the EU has traditionally avoided expanding such missions into offensive actions, instead reinforcing diplomatic engagement and fostering stable coalitions with its partners.

This approach has been evident in operations such as Aspides in early 2024, as well as in the Coordinated Maritime Presence in the north western Indian Ocean and the Strait of Hormuz. In the latter case, however, a key limitation has emerged in the voluntary nature of coordination. Member states deploy naval or aerial assets under national command, while a relatively small EU coordination cell synchronizes activities. This structure has ensured flexibility, but at the cost of limited operational coherence and strategic impact (VOYCE, 2025).

In light of recent developments in the Middle East, it has become increasingly clear that such an arrangement may no longer be sufficient. Under a functional multilateral framework, the EU could seek to adapt this model by strengthening coordination mechanisms and enhancing its capacity to act collectively, thereby repositioning itself more effectively within the global strategic landscape.

This would imply a more localized and issue driven approach, focused on engaging specific actors and promoting targeted agreements tailored to the needs of individual partners. By doing so, the EU could reduce its exposure to highly volatile macro level dependencies, particularly in the energy sector, and instead pursue more stable and diversified relationships with individual states (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2026). Such agreements would likely be faster to negotiate, more efficient to implement, and less prone to the compromises that often dilute broader multilateral frameworks.

In essence, a strategy of sectoral engagement may offer the EU a pathway to greater resilience and operational relevance in an increasingly fragmented international environment.

Transformative strategic autonomy moment

The most optimistic scenario holds that the Iran war functions as a genuine catalyst as the crisis that finally converts years of strategic autonomy rhetoric into reality. There are structural reasons that take this possibility seriously. Even before Operation Epic Fury, European defence spending was rising rapidly, and the EU was pursuing efforts to diversify its trade relationships by pursuing new agreements with partners such as India, Indonesia, and Mercosur (Matthijs, 2026).In January 2026, Germany and France launched the E6 initiative bringing together the six largest EU economies with Germany’s vice-chancellor Lars Klingbeil declaring: “Europe has to become stronger and more resilient. Continuing as before is not an option” (Höller, 2026).The Iran War injects new urgency into that logic. A combination of pressure from Washington, collective defence commitments, and concerns about energy prices and future refugee flows is increasingly drawing European states deeper into the conflict’s orbit.

In this scenario, the crisis would accelerate three interconnected developments. First, on defence integration: defence clusters, small groups of aligned states, would provide the most viable route to strengthen European military capabilities, allowing for greater industrial and operational cooperation, with the EU supporting and connecting these clusters into a more coherent European defence ecosystem. Second, on energy: Council President Costa has already framed the Hormuz crisis as an opportunity, arguing that accelerating the energy transition is “the only way to become autonomous, independent, and secure” (Ventura, 2026). Third, on diplomacy: the EU could carve out a distinct role through proactive support for democratic change in Iran, filling a vacuum Washington has left open on the question of political transition (Youngs, 2026).

Yet the risks of this scenario are substantial and the E6 itself illustrates them sharply. The initiative creates a “two-speed” Europe that bypasses the EU’s consensus model but risks fracturing the map into a nucleus of western and central states, pragmatic Nordics, and a sprawling third Europe of divergent interests. More critically, even within the E6, the Iran war has exposed irreconcilable positions: Germany mostly aligned itself with Washington’s framing of the conflict, while Spain condemned the strikes as illegal and refused base access. A coalition for strategic autonomy that cannot agree on whether the triggering war was legal is a fragile foundation.The domestic political horizon compounds this fragility. In France, Marine Le Pen’s RN remains on course to contest the next presidency on a platform hostile to EU defence integration (Marchal, 2026). In Germany, the AfD is now often polling as the country’s largest party for the first time in history (Spiegel, 2026). In Poland, PiS-backed president Nawrocki could complicate the government’s pro-European foreign policy agenda. For all the momentum surrounding EU defence cooperation, fragmentation remains the system’s default setting, with national protectionism continuing to shape procurement choices as member states privilege sovereignty and domestic industrial interests over efficiency. History offers little comfort: the June 2025 twelve-day war between Israel and Iran was already framed as a turning point for European strategic thinking, yet it produced no lasting institutional change. The transformative moment may arrive, but it has been announced too many times before.

Post-conflict diplomacy

A final, more long term scenario envisions the European Union reasserting its relevance in the post conflict phase, where diplomatic engagement, reconstruction efforts, and institutional frameworks regain central importance. Historically, the EU has demonstrated its greatest comparative advantage in precisely these contexts, acting as a mediator, facilitator, and provider of economic incentives. The negotiation of the JCPOA remains a notable example of the Union’s capacity to shape complex diplomatic outcomes, even in highly polarized environments.

The European Union has supported de-escalation from the outset, and the ceasefire may be seen as a partial confirmation of this position (European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2026). In this context, its primary role should be to facilitate rapprochement between the parties. However, given its current political marginalization and the limited consideration it receives from the current United States administration in the management of the crisis, the EU may instead focus on positioning itself as a strategic actor in the post conflict phase, particularly in the field of reconstruction. By acting as a credible financial provider and a source of technical support, the Union could seek to build international legitimacy, which in the long term may translate into greater influence over decision making processes among its 27 member states.

At the same time, this ambition is complicated by the strong presence of other key actors, including the United States, closely aligned with the regional power Israel, as well as China and other regional stakeholders. While the EU remains open to dialogue, the space in which it could operate diplomatically is, at least temporarily, occupied by actors that have little incentive to relinquish their influence.

Moreover, internal divisions may once again limit the Union’s ability to act cohesively, while credibility gaps accumulated during the conflict could weaken its influence at the negotiating table. As previous crises have shown, the EU is often strongest after conflicts it has failed to shape, a pattern that risks repeating itself unless accompanied by greater strategic coherence.

In this sense, post conflict diplomacy offers both an opportunity and a warning. The EU may regain relevance, but only within the boundaries set by others, unless it addresses the structural constraints that have defined its role throughout the crisis.

EU‘s normative contradiction

All of the EU’s foreign policy actions in the Iran War circle around the question of normative contradiction. The EU has built its identity and reputation for decades based on multilateralism and a rules-based world order. However, we do not see a unified condemnation of a war most likely violating the UN charter. The EU faces growing criticism of applying diverging standards based on who the perpetrator in an international conflict is.

The legal situation is as follows: the UN charter prohibits the use of force except when authorized by the Security Council or in cases of self-defence against an armed attack, and there is overwhelming agreement among legal scholars that neither of those conditions apply in this case (Dworkin, 2026). Over 100 international law experts, including senior professors and former judge advocates general, signed an open letter concluding that the initiation of the campaign was a clear violation of the UN charter and raising concerns about violations of international humanitarian law (Dannenbaum et al., 2026). Yet the EU’s formal response has carefully avoided saying so. The statement issued by High Representative Kallas on behalf of EU member states called for “full respect of international law, including the principles of the UN Charter”, without acknowledging the overwhelming consensus in Europe that the attack contravened the Charter (Dworkin, 2026). Calling for respect of a norm while declining to name its violation is not diplomacy but evasion.

The contradiction runs deeper than this single conflict. Former High Representative Borrell had already warned that the EU faces criticism for “applying double standards regarding international law in Ukraine and in Gaza,” stressing that “if we are unable to say so for both places, we lack the moral authority necessary to make our voice heard” (Borrell, 2023). The Iran War adds another chapter to this pattern. European leaders risk projecting an image of paralysis, struggling to defend European interests while hesitating to hold close allies accountable when they act outside international law. This has strategic consequences beyond the immediate conflict: governments in the Global South are increasingly likely to accuse Europeans of double standards when seeking support for Ukraine, with a corresponding erosion of soft power and diplomatic credibility.

The internal dimension compounds this further. The ambiguity among the Member States neither condemning nor supporting the attack amounts in Tocci’s words to “another nail in the coffin for our credibility,” particularly damaging for a bloc whose international identity rests precisely on its claim to principled multilateralism (Tocci, 2026). A union that cannot agree on whether a war is legal or illegal already answered the question of how relevant it is.

The central challenge facing the EU is therefore not only how to respond to the Iran war, but how to restore the normative coherence on which its global standing depends. If the EU can act together to defend those principles and trusted partnerships across the globe, it can reclaim the influence it needed to shape a more stable and just international order.

Conclusion

The Iran war has once again exposed a structural dilemma at the heart of European foreign policy. The European Union remains deeply affected by geopolitical crises unfolding in its wider neighborhood, yet continues to struggle to translate this exposure into meaningful strategic agency. From the erosion of the JCPOA to the disruption of energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, the EU has found itself reacting to events largely shaped by others.

The scenarios outlined in this article reflect the range of possible trajectories, from continued marginalization as a strategic spectator to more pragmatic forms of engagement through functional multilateralism, to the more ambitious but uncertain prospect of a transformative push toward strategic autonomy, and finally to a renewed role in post conflict diplomacy. Each of these pathways carries both opportunities and constraints, yet all are ultimately conditioned by the same underlying factors: internal fragmentation, external dependence, and limited coercive capacity.

At the same time, the EU’s response has revealed a deeper normative tension. The gap between its commitment to a rules based international order and its reluctance to clearly uphold those principles in practice risks undermining its credibility on the global stage.

The central challenge for the European Union is therefore not only to choose a path forward, but to reconcile ambition with capability. Without greater political cohesion and a willingness to act, Europe risks remaining a global actor in economic terms, but a secondary one in geopolitical affairs.

Europe’s challenge is no longer to define its role in the world, but to prove that it is capable of playing it.

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