The European Union’s External Economic Strategy in an Age of Geopolitical Fragmentation

Context

The European Union operates in a geopolitical landscape increasingly marked by rising hostility and mounting diplomatic challenges, which have led to a weakening of international law and a growing inability among policymakers to propose, advance, and finalize new trade agreements without resorting to defensive instruments perceived as aggressive by external actors.In such a context, the ability to seize emerging opportunities becomes crucial. Brussels thus finds itself pursuing multiple avenues: long-delayed agreements that may finally reach completion after decades of negotiations, new and rapidly concluded economic partnerships, and a redefinition of what it means to be an ally or a trading partner. Equally important is the capacity to manage the economy efficiently and effectively as a tool of political deterrence.Amid these turbulent waters, the EU and its stakeholders are striving to identify viable, or presumed viable, alternatives to restore a fragile sense of stability, one that now appears increasingly elusive in today’s global order.

EU–India Trade Relations: Strategic Diversification in a Fragmented Global Order

The long road to an agreement

On 27 January 2026, the European Union and India concluded negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement within the framework of the EU–India Summit. After nearly two decades of negotiations initiated in 2007 and over ten years of suspended negotiations since 2013, the Free Trade Agreement is a major achievement in the history of relations between Brussels and New Delhi. Although the agreement is yet to be ratified by both parties before its entry into force, its political conclusion is already a strategic turning point.

The negotiations had been on hold mainly because of structural differences between the two parties’ positions. The European Union had been seeking greater access for its goods such as automobiles, wines and spirits, as well as stronger rules on services, intellectual property rights, and regulations. India had been cautious about opening its markets and had been seeking limited regulatory compatibility.

A new start to the negotiations was given in 2022 in a very different geopolitical environment from the one in which the negotiations had been frozen since 2013. The war in Ukraine, supply chain disruptions, and the intensification of US–China rivalry transformed trade policy from a technocratic domain into an instrument of economic security. The renewed momentum behind the EU–India FTA reflects this broader strategic recalibration.

The EU-India FTA in Today’s political context

The EU-India FTA is not an ordinary economic agreement; rather, it is set in the framework of a shifting global environment. The trade balance between the EU and India currently exceeds €180 billion in goods and services annually. The goods trade between the two economies alone stands at about €120 billion in 2024. The EU is one of India’s biggest trade partners, while India is one of the fastest-growing economies in the world.

The agreement is expected to result in zero or quasi-zero tariffs on over 90 percent of goods traded between the two economies. This is likely to result in an estimated €4 billion in tariff savings for European exporters on an annual basis. The key sectors are likely to include automotive goods, machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and agri-food products. In the case of India, access to the European market in textiles, pharmaceuticals, and services is particularly pertinent.

The economic data are important, but the agreement’s timing is politically noteworthy. In an environment characterized by the revival of tariff wars and the adoption of protectionist policies in various economies around the world, including in the transatlantic relationship, the European Union has an interest in strengthening its economic partnerships. Deepening the relationship with India will make the Union more resilient and minimize the danger of over-reliance on a small number of economic partners. Diversification has thus to be understood as a form of insurance in an increasingly uncertain world trade system, although this is not the only form that needs to be pursued for the sustained growth of the European economies in the future.

Why it matters for the European Union

The agreement has several implications for the European Union: It reinforces the European presence in the Indo-Pacific region, which has become crucial for the global economic and geopolitical balance. It further supports the European Union’s vision of ‘open strategic autonomy’ through the development of its trade networks and the reduction of its vulnerabilities. It increases the European Union’s power in the increasingly fractured global trade system in which economic interdependencies have become increasingly politicized.

However, the expectations should be tempered in light of the reality that Indian foreign policy has traditionally been guided by the imperative of ‘strategic autonomy’. This means that India seeks economic and political partners that provide maximum flexibility and minimum alignment. This has been evidenced by the continued engagement with Russia and the cautious stance in the multilateral arena. The partnership with the EU would therefore continue to be a pragmatic partnership, not an ideological one.

Conclusive Assessment

The EU-India FTA is a reflection of economic opportunity as well as geopolitical maneuvering. It shows that even in a fragmented international system, large-scale economic agreements can be forged between major global players. However, it would only find long-term success not just through the reduction of tariffs, but through the effective implementation of the agreement.

Thus, it would perhaps be more correct to say that the agreement has more to do with the attempt by the European Union to leverage its economic power to achieve geopolitical influence in a multipolar international system. However, it would only find long-term success if the Union is able to sustain the level of internal cohesion in the face of a rapidly changing international scenario where economics and politics would increasingly overlap.

The EU–Mercosur Agreement: Strategic Ambition Confronting Internal Fragmentation

The Mercosur saga has accompanied the European Union, its institutions, and its citizens for over 25 years, and the affair appears set to continue for several more, caught between committed advocates of new economic horizons and sectors and member states firmly opposed to such an opening.The Southern Common Market (comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) is the largest trade bloc in South America, established in 1991 and representing the sixth largest economy in the world. Relations with Europe were first formalized in 1999 through the Inter-Regional Framework Cooperation Agreement and gradually deepened over the following decades. The most significant milestones were reached on 6 December 2024, with the conclusion of a Comprehensive Partnership Agreement grounded in political cooperation on one side and trade and investment provisions on the other, and on 9 January 2026, when the Council approved two landmark agreements proposed by the Commission the previous September: the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA) and the Interim Trade Agreement (iTA).It is precisely over the substance of these instruments that the first fault lines within the political landscape of member states have begun to emerge, as illustrated by the European Parliament’s decision to refer the text to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The fact that Commission President von der Leyen has expressed readiness to provisionally implement the iTA matters little when set against the uncertainty surrounding the final legal status of the deal and a considerable strategic vulnerability, one that has once again slowed an already inherently complex decision-making process.The agreement with Mercosur nonetheless offers a range of compelling provisions and initiatives, extending well beyond the purely economic sphere, with the aim of strengthening a market encompassing over 720 million people across areas including sustainable development, digital transformation, security and counter-terrorism, climate change, and innovation.The liberalization of trade and investment remains the centrepiece of the technical work carried out by European and South American negotiators, who have placed strong emphasis on tariff reductions, particularly in the automotive sector (currently attracting duties of up to 35%), machinery (currently 14–20%), and pharmaceuticals (currently 14%), generating projected annual savings of up to four billion euros. Specifically, the Agreement provides for the gradual phasing out, over a number of years, of approximately 91% of duties on EU exports to Mercosur countries and approximately 92% of duties on Mercosur exports to the EU.This is complemented by open access to new markets, as EU firms will be able to compete in Mercosur government procurement processes. Furthermore, given that the four Latin American countries are key suppliers of materials critical to the digital and energy transitions, the agreement has placed particular emphasis on securing more reliable EU access to these raw materials.It is projected that, by 2040, the agreement will increase EU GDP by more than €77.6 billion, boost exports by up to €50 billion (+39%), and support up to 600,000 jobs.However, it is the agricultural dimension that has generated the sharpest divisions in public opinion. While tariffs in this sector will also be substantially reduced, with projected gains for EU agricultural sectors of +54% in beverages, +37% in fruit and vegetables, +21% in vegetable oils, and +102% in dairy products, and an overall increase in agricultural export values of nearly 50%, countries such as France, Poland, and Ireland have been vocal in their opposition, citing the risk of a significant influx of South American products (beef in particular, in the French case), produced at lower costs and under less stringent environmental regulations. This would give South American exporters a structural competitive advantage to the detriment of their European counterparts.The European Commission has moved swiftly on this front, introducing safeguard clauses and protective mechanisms in an attempt to accommodate the concerns of different member states.Starting from the recognition and protection of 357 European PDO and PGI food and beverage products, the framework also provides for enhanced import controls to ensure that only products meeting the EU’s stringent food safety standards may enter the single market. The Commission will regularly monitor imports of sensitive agricultural products under the Agreement, submitting six-monthly reports to the Council and the European Parliament to assess their impact on Union markets and individual member states. Where significant import surges or price declines are recorded, an investigation may be triggered if import prices fall at least 10% below EU prices and imports increase or prices decline by 10% or more.Should serious injury be established, the EU may temporarily suspend tariff preferences. A rapid response mechanism is also provided for, enabling the immediate initiation of investigations, the adoption of provisional measures within 21 days, and the conclusion of reviews within four months.On 16 July, the European Commission further presented its proposals for the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) within the framework of the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The central innovation is the creation of a single fund of €865 billion consolidating various EU resources, including agricultural ones. Of this total, at least €293.7 billion is earmarked for direct income support to farmers. Access to funding will be channelled through national and regional partnership plans, with the stated objectives of streamlining management, tailoring interventions to territorial specificities, and reducing structural disparities. Overall funding levels are expected to remain broadly in line with those currently in place, albeit within a more integrated and flexible management framework.While some member states (Italy among them) have found these proposals broadly satisfactory and have shifted to supporting the final agreement, others remain anchored to positions driven, in no small measure, by domestic political considerations. The prevailing climate of European instability is not unrelated to the internal fragility of individual member states. France offers the most telling example. Acute political polarization is placing severe pressure on traditional centrist forces and the Macronist centre, with the President caught between the far right, the radical left, and the country’s powerful agricultural unions. The outcome is a cycle of further fragmentation and persistent repositioning, as political actors search for an electoral equilibrium that appears perpetually on the verge of collapse.

Mercosur remains in the balance, and with it the prospect of a truly united European Union.

EU–Russia: From Interdependence to Strategic Rupture

The relationship between the European Union and Russia has never been reducible to geography or trade; it has always embodied a deep and recurring historical-philosophical tension that casts Russia as Europe’s constitutive “other.” Geographically embedded within the continent yet culturally self-differentiating, Russia has long occupied a position of paradoxical exclusion, a civilization-state that conceives of itself as strategically and culturally distinct from the Western liberal order. From the Napoleonic Wars to the existential trauma of the Second World War, Russia’s historical experience forged a strategic culture centered on territorial depth and defensive autonomy, imperatives that more compact European states neither shared nor fully understood. This formative inheritance cultivated an enduring suspicion of Western liberal institutions and a persistent expectation that Moscow should function as a co-architect of continental security, rather than a subordinate participant in a rules-based order designed elsewhere. These diverging epistemologies of international order were never fully reconciled after 1991; they were merely obscured by the pragmatic optimism of early post-Cold War engagement.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, EU-Russia relations were constructed on the premise that deepening economic interdependence would serve as a political stabilizer, gradually drawing Russia into a shared European framework. Signed in 1994 and entering into force on 1 December 1997, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) provided the institutional scaffolding for this era of cautious engagement, establishing a structure for bilateral dialogue across trade, science, human rights, and democratic norms. Nevertheless, a widening gap in strategic expectations soon undermined its foundations. While Brussels conceived of cooperation as a process of gradual Russian convergence toward European standards, Moscow increasingly demanded recognition as a sovereign great power with legitimate sphere-of-influence interests in the post-Soviet space. Even during the pragmatically constructive phase of the early 2000s, exemplified by the 2001 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, the underlying rivalry over the shared neighborhood remained an unresolved friction point. Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008 offered an early and unambiguous warning that was absorbed without producing a systemic recalibration of EU strategy toward Moscow.

At the structural core of this relationship lay an energy-centered interdependence in which hydrocarbons functioned simultaneously as the primary commercial bond and as an instrument of political leverage. In 2013, Russian supplies accounted for approximately 39% of the EU’s total natural gas imports, generating a mutual dependency subject to wildly asymmetric security interpretations. For European policymakers, this interdependence was designed to bind Russia into a predictable economic trajectory, operating on the liberal institutionalist assumption that market access would translate into political restraint and norm compliance. For Moscow, by contrast, energy revenues provided essential fiscal stability while the supply relationship conferred strategic leverage that could be selectively activated during episodes of political friction, as the gas crises of 2006 and 2009 demonstrated. This asymmetry was not merely technical; it was constitutive of the broader power dynamic and reflected fundamentally irreconcilable understandings of what economic interdependence was ultimately for.

The 2014 annexation of Crimea and the ensuing conflict in eastern Ukraine constituted the first decisive stress test of this architecture, producing a structural break in which the relationship shifted from managed cooperation to a sanctions-based confrontation. The first restrictive measures were adopted in March 2014, in direct response to the illegal annexation of Crimea. The EU initially pursued diplomatic channels before imposing targeted asset freezes and sectoral measures restricting Russia’s access to capital markets and advanced technologies. Crucially, however, the response remained deliberately calibrated to preserve the energy relationship, allowing gas flows to continue largely unimpeded. This reflected both the uneven exposure of member states and the deeply entrenched path dependencies that no single diplomatic rupture could sever overnight. This period effectively politicized interdependence without yet fully weaponizing it. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked the definitive crossing of that threshold.

Since February 2022, the EU has deployed an increasingly layered toolkit of economic statecraft targeting both Russia’s financial architecture and its real economy. Sanctions now cover Russia’s financial, trade, energy, transport, technology, and defence sectors, with nineteen successive packages of measures adopted since the start of the full-scale invasion. Alongside financial restrictions and trade bans, the EU immobilized the assets and reserves of the Central Bank of Russia held by EU institutions, with approximately 200 billion euros frozen primarily in Belgian clearing facilities. These packages also encompass extensive export controls on dual-use goods, specifically calibrated to degrade Russia’s capacity for military-industrial replenishment. They are designed not as a singular shock but as a cumulative pressure system intended to raise the long-run costs of sustaining a war economy by severing access to both capital and advanced inputs.

The energy dimension of this confrontation has undergone its own structural transformation. Russian pipeline gas imports fell from around 40% of total EU pipeline gas in 2021 to approximately 6% by 2025, with overall import volumes dropping from over 150 billion cubic metres in 2021 to around 40.9 billion cubic metres by 2025. Crude oil imports from Russia declined from 29% of EU petroleum oil imports in early 2021 to just 1% by late 2025, and coal imports were eliminated entirely through sanctions. These figures represent a genuine strategic reorientation of European energy supply, made possible primarily through a sharp increase in LNG imports from the United States and Norway, alongside an overall reduction in gas consumption across the Union. However, Russian LNG flows, which were never fully sanctioned, began rising again from the fourth quarter of 2023 onward, driven by continued structural dependencies in specific member states including Italy, France, and Czechia. In direct response to this residual exposure, the EU Council formally adopted a regulation in January 2026 introducing a stepwise and permanent ban on Russian natural gas imports, with prohibitions on short-term contracts taking effect from March 2026 and long-term pipeline contracts phased out by autumn 2027. This legislative step represents a qualitative shift in European energy policy: whereas sanctions are temporary instruments requiring periodic renewal, a regulation establishes a structurally durable phase-out trajectory significantly more difficult to reverse through political pressure.

The economic pain of this energy transition and the broader inflationary consequences of the war have provided fertile ground for a political phenomenon that scholars have begun to term European Red-Brownism, the convergence of far-left and far-right anti-liberal movements around a shared platform of Euroscepticism and tacit or explicit pro-Russian sympathy. These forces seek to erode the sanctions consensus by reframing support for Ukraine as an elite project that inflicts disproportionate harm on domestic working-class households, effectively weaponizing economic grievance against the strategic consensus. The political salience of this narrative varies considerably across the Union. While frontline states, particularly the Baltic republics and Poland, regard Russia as an existential security threat requiring unconditional solidarity, others treat it as a difficult but ultimately manageable partner whose prolonged isolation carries prohibitive domestic costs. Member-state governments are consequently forced into a continuous balancing act between long-term security commitments and short-term political tolerance for economic stress, rendering EU unity a costly and perpetually renegotiated achievement rather than a stable equilibrium.

This internal fragmentation translates directly into a structural decision-making constraint of the first order. As established by the Treaty on European Union, foreign policy decisions within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) formally require unanimity among all twenty-seven member states, meaning that any single government retains the power to block, delay, or dilute collective action regardless of the position of the remaining twenty-six. A total of 45 vetoes occurred in CFSP matters between 2011 and 2025, with approximately one-third of them recorded in the last year and a half alone, reflecting both increased geopolitical divergence and a growing willingness to exploit the unanimity mechanism as a tool of political leverage rather than a genuine expression of principled disagreement.

No member state has embodied this vulnerability more acutely than Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has repeatedly threatened to block the six-monthly renewal of restrictive measures to extract unrelated concessions from Brussels. In January 2025, Hungary linked the renewal of the sanctions package to the issue of Ukrainian gas transit through its territory; in March 2025, the Polish presidency secured a last-minute compromise only by agreeing to remove four names from the individual sanctions list. The pattern continued into 2026, when Hungary vetoed both the twentieth sanctions package and a 90-billion-euro loan to Ukraine over the Druzhba pipeline dispute. In May 2025, Brussels was already preparing contingency plans to circumvent future Hungarian vetoes by shifting certain sanctions to instruments requiring only a qualified majority; this possibility materialized in December 2025, when the EU used emergency economic powers to freeze Russian Central Bank assets without unanimous approval. Scholars have characterized this behavior as soft hostage-taking, a strategy combining formal veto power with tactical issue-linkage to extract concessions while publicly denying any such linkage.

Italy’s position has added a further layer of ambiguity. Unlike Hungary, whose obstructionism reflects a declared strategic proximity to Moscow, Italy’s contradictions are rooted in domestic coalition dynamics. In May 2023, Italy joined the Group of Friends on Qualified Majority Voting in the CFSP, a group of member states established at Germany’s initiative formally calling for a transition away from unanimity in EU foreign policy; yet in October 2025, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni publicly reversed this position, declaring before Parliament her opposition to abolishing the national veto. This oscillation reflects the structural tension between Forza Italia’s pro-European instincts and Fratelli d’Italia’s sovereigntist reflexes. Taken together, the Hungarian and Italian cases illustrate that the challenge to EU cohesion is neither monolithic nor ideologically uniform: it encompasses both deliberate obstruction and the more diffuse noise of coalition governments unable to maintain a consistent European position over time. The crisis has therefore reinvigorated the debate over transitioning to qualified majority voting in the CFSP, a reform for which a faster path already exists through the special passerelle clause, a treaty provision allowing the shift from unanimity to QMV (Qualified majority voting) if the European Council unanimously supports such a move, without requiring formal treaty renegotiation. The trajectory of EU-Russia relations thus illuminates a structural truth of broader and enduring consequence: external economic strategy must be understood as a domain in which the management of internal political cohesion, the preservation of collective decision-making capacity, and the long-term credibility of strategic commitment are ends in themselves, and constraints that must be continuously renewed against the centrifugal pressures of domestic politics.

EU-USA:

The trade relationship has been going on for hundreds of years, with dominant actors in one period, and other actors in another. In the current era, we see growing hostility from the US, especially since the investiture of Donald Trump for his second term, which has a much more direct approach, especially in policy-making, which completely changes the current dynamics.

As of early March 2026, the current tariffs for 150 countries is at 15% for main exports. There are special cases made for trades where the US is “winning” in the trade. We have observed that since the beginning of Trump’s second term, the different economic policies between the USA and the EU have become hostile. Where trade was seen as mutually beneficial a decade ago, it has now become a leverage tool for each party to use as a show of strength.

European tools:

After the attempt of the USA to acquire Greenland, and the overall restraining force to prevent this from happening, Trump had threatened to boost tariffs to 25% for Denmark in January 2026 if they did not sell Greenland. However, the EU has been prepared against threats of economic coercion by a third party since the adoption of the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) in December 2023. The ACI combines security and trade policies against any country threatening the trade partnership in the EU. The methods may include, but are not limited to: tariffs, restrictions, limits to access public programs and financial markets and/or measures that affect the intellectual property services in Europe. The goal of the ACI is to protect member countries from being coerced by countries outside the EU into making decisions that severely affect their economy or their sovereignty. By providing a sole economic response, the EU guarantees that no military force will be involved, with trades seen as the driver of threats for any country.

In more recent times, with the ongoing conflict going on in the Middle East, we see that trades are still a tool used by the United States to try and get countries of the EU onboard with their projects. We have seen that with the refusal of Pedro Sanchez, the Prime minister of Spain, to allow American soldiers on Spanish war bases in the Middle East, Donald Trump has threatened to increase taxes on imported goods from Spain. However, the impact for countries under American tariffs is not as great as Donald Trump hoped it would be, since the economic burden falls on the consumers, not the producers of the goods. This situation is very temporary, as the circumstances change very often, and have a great impact on the trade between the MAGA regime and the European regime. The previous overlap in political position on the case of nuclear power for Iran between the EU and USA allowed for preferential trade agreements with those countries; however, we can expect a radical change in the economic affairs between the 2 poles, where the EU would have to rely more and more on internal commerce and a change in the production of goods in member countries, so as to fill the void created by the retreat of the American market from European firms, and the opposite.

Rapidly-evolving dynamics:

As seen previously, the EU has mechanisms in place to face any threats against their respective economies from other actors, including the ACI, but it hasn’t been used so far, so we don’t know how strong it is. We will probably not use it against the USA, because of the close history shared between the 2 parties, but it is important for the EU to be prepared to use it if “fishy” tactics are used to meddle with European politics and economies.

The trade situations with the USA evolve rapidly, but what can be assured is the abandonment of the global trade order as we know it, and a world dictated by overtly aggressive negotiation methods. In September 2025, which may seem like a long time ago for avid followers of geopolitics, President of European Commission Von der Leyen signed a deal with the USA guaranteeing preferential trading terms for them, essentially going against what the World Trade Organization (WTO) exists for. This agreement allowed for the USA to have access to the European market without tariffs, whilst barely lowering tariffs for products exported from the EU to the USA. Additionally, the USA put higher tariffs rates for some other countries in the world.

What this means for Europe:

This situation highlights multiple issues, including the vulnerability of European economies to decisions taken by other actors and other events, as well as the independence of those economies from the change in prices of technologies, rare earth and energy prices. Looking forward, the EU is most likely to focus on the internal development of the free market, reduce its dependence to the US market (because of its volatility) and strengthen the production of domestic industries. The damage done by Donald Trump on the trade relation between the 2 actors presented here is not irreversible, but will certainly last for some time.

It is important to note that since the EU counts 27 active members, the reaction and consequence of tariffs are different. Germany and Austria, for example, have higher exports due to strong machinery and car industries, meaning the tariffs will have a greater impact on them than on other countries. Additionally, different countries have different relations with the US and Donald Trump, meaning that Western European countries are more in favour of retaliatory tariffs, whilst Orban’s Hungary are more eager to negotiate with the USA. These differences that tariffs bring alongside the difference in the appropriate reaction each European actor believes is right means that it is difficult to present a unified front, and that decision-making takes longer, and that these tariffs last for longer, meaning more costs for those European actors. The difficulty in uniting itself, especially in these moments, is probably the biggest weakness for the EU on topics as delicate as these.

Policy recommendations

European institutions must undertake difficult decisions to lay the groundwork for a future that is as prosperous and resilient as possible. The range of available policy options is broad and requires thorough and careful analysis.The first issue concerns European decision-making procedures. Unanimity remains the most contentious and sensitive topic and demands both caution and political compromise. In light of Hungary’s veto on the €90 billion loan to Ukraine, the new Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten stated that “the new Dutch government is in favour of progressively reducing decision-making by unanimity at the European level.” Conversely, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has expressed opposition to abandoning unanimity, particularly in the field of foreign policy.Undoubtedly, an agreement reached by all 27 Member States is inherently broader and more representative than one adopted through alternative voting mechanisms. However, the fundamental question is different. What should be prioritized? A comprehensive but cumbersome agreement that is often achievable only in the medium to long term, or a faster and more flexible decision-making process supported by appropriate control and review mechanisms, capable of overcoming excessive bureaucracy and enabling the Union to act swiftly in an increasingly fast-paced global environment?The European Union is currently facing multiple crises, including U.S. tariffs, high energy prices, particularly following sanctions on Russia, the impact of climate policies, and low-cost competition from China. One proposal put forward by President Macron is the introduction of a “Buy European” policy. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson has opposed this approach, stating in the Financial Times that his government prioritises quality and innovation over restricting trade or partnerships with other countries. This divergence reflects a broader tension between more protectionist approaches and the traditionally open-market orientation of some Member States.These differing perspectives may find partial reconciliation in the numerous trade agreements the European Union is currently pursuing, demonstrating its capacity and willingness to adapt to the external environment. The quality of these initiatives appears substantial, given the EU’s extensive engagement across global markets. However, a recurring issue remains. Such proactive measures are often undertaken only under significant external pressure, whether from competitors or, increasingly, from long-standing allies. The ongoing negotiations with India exemplify this duality. They reflect an impressive level of political and economic mediation that nonetheless tends to emerge hurriedly and primarily in response to critical circumstances.The European Union should instead prioritize these capabilities in more stable contexts, if such contexts can still be meaningfully identified, guided by a long-term and strategic vision.Finally, the Union’s geopolitical positioning must remain consistent and carefully managed. Strong and clearly defined stances, such as that on Ukraine, risk being undermined by the actions of individual political leaders. Such fragmentation would negatively affect the EU’s credibility, effectiveness, and influence, with broader repercussions across all areas of its activity.

Final remarks and conclusion

The challenges of the new decade demand expertise, knowledge, political courage, and the ability to mediate among the vast array of stakeholders gravitating around the EU system, beginning, above all, with those within it. These tensions do not exist in a vacuum. The European Union is simultaneously navigating the prolonged economic and geopolitical consequences of its sanctions regime against Russia, the structural disruptions to energy and commodity markets that followed, and the renewed pressure of American tariff policies that have forced a fundamental reassessment of transatlantic trade relations. In this context, the search for new and diversified economic partnerships is not merely an option but a strategic necessity. The India and the Mercosur agreements must therefore be read not in isolation, but as one component of a broader repositioning effort at a moment of acute global uncertainty.The strategy of the future is built in the present. The question is no longer whether Europe needs new partnerships. It plainly does. The question is whether Europe possesses the institutional maturity and the political cohesion to pursue them, or whether it will remain, once again, a spectator of a world that moves without waiting for its consensus.

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