Like-Minded by Necessity: The New EU-Canada Strategic Convergence

1. Introduction

The EU-Canada relationship has long been the kind of partnership that rarely appears on front pages: institutionally solid, value-aligned, and easy to overlook. For most of the post-Cold War period, Brussels and Ottawa cooperated through trade committees, diplomatic channels, and periodic joint summits, comfortable in the assumption that shared democratic values would keep the relationship stable without requiring much strategic attention. That assumption no longer holds.

What has changed is the price of maintaining it. Canada’s government has concluded that an economy built around privileged access to a single dominant export market has limited room to manoeuvre when that access is called into question, a recognition that has driven Ottawa’s accelerating search for alternative partnerships across Europe, the Indo-Pacific and Latin America. The EU has reached a parallel conclusion from the opposite direction: after years of supply-chain vulnerabilities and energy dependence exposed by geopolitical shocks, Brussels has reorganized its external economic relationships around the concept of economic security, seeking partners with compatible regulatory standards, access to critical materials, and the institutional capacity for sustained cooperation. Both dynamics sit within a wider context in which protectionism is rising even among traditional allies, supply chains are being rerouted, and a rules-based trading order is under strain that affects every economy with significant global exposure.

The EU and Canada are no longer simply natural trading partners. They are becoming strategic allies, driven by necessity: by the demands of economic security and supply-chain resilience, by the transitions underway in digital governance and clean technology, and by a transatlantic order that neither side can take for granted. CETA and the Strategic Partnership Agreement remain the institutional foundations of this relationship, but the real momentum now comes from these new imperatives.

2. The Foundations of the Relationship

Two agreements underpin everything else in the EU-Canada relationship. According to the European Parliament, the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) was signed in Brussels on 30 October 2016 and provisionally entered into force on 1 April 2017 (European Parliament, 2017). The SPA structures political and diplomatic cooperation across a broad range of areas, including human rights, international peace and security, sustainable development, and justice and security. Like CETA, it is a mixed agreement: full entry into force requires ratification by all EU member states’ parliaments, a process that, for both agreements, remains incomplete.

The second pillar is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. According to the European Commission’s Access2Markets portal, CETA entered into force provisionally on 21 September 2017, meaning most of its provisions now apply (European Commission, n.d.a). Full ratification by all relevant national, and in several cases regional, parliaments is still pending. The provisions not yet in force include the investment court system and certain transparency-related clauses.

These two agreements were the foundation, not the endpoint. In the years that followed their entry into force, the relationship acquired a broader architecture of sector-specific arrangements. According to the European Commission’s DG Trade factsheet on Canada, the EU-Canada Strategic Partnership on Raw Materials was endorsed in 2021 (European Commission, n.d.b). According to the European Parliament’s March 2026 recommendation on enhanced EU-Canada cooperation (A10-0035/2026), the Digital Partnership and the Green Alliance were both launched on 23 November 2023, at the EU-Canada Leaders’ Summit in St. John’s, Newfoundland (European Parliament, 2026). On 23 June 2025, on the margins of the twentieth EU-Canada Summit in Brussels, the EU and Canada signed a Security and Defence Partnership, as confirmed by the European External Action Service (EEAS, 2025).

The significance of this architecture is not that it was ambitious; it is that it was built before the current pressures arrived. What was constructed as a framework for a comfortable relationship is now available to serve a more demanding one.

3. CETA and Economic Resilience

CETA remains the core economic infrastructure of EU-Canada relations. According to the European Commission’s DG Trade factsheet on Canada, using 2025 data, bilateral trade in goods and services grew by 80 percent between 2016 and 2025, reaching 130 billion euros, up from 72.1 billion euros in 2016 (European Commission, n.d.b). Trade in goods alone grew by 76 percent in the eight years since CETA’s provisional entry into force, reaching 81.5 billion euros. The Council of the EU’s trade infographic, using 2024 data, placed combined goods and services trade at approximately 125 billion euros and reported 72 percent combined growth between 2016 and 2024, consistent with the Commission’s more recent figures (Council of the EU, n.d.). The same Council source, citing an ex-post evaluation of CETA, found that the agreement adds approximately 3.2 billion euros to EU GDP annually.

These figures record a commercial success. The more consequential shift, however, is in how CETA is now being used. The agreement was negotiated between 2009 and 2016 as an instrument of trade liberalization, when the dominant assumption in international economic policy was the progressive opening of markets. In a context of supply-chain disruption, tariff pressure and rising protectionism, CETA provides something different: a ready-made platform for economic diversification that neither side has to build from scratch.

The evolution of the relationship reflects this reorientation. According to a European Commission press release of 6 March 2026, on 5 March 2026 at the fifth meeting of the CETA Joint Committee in Toronto, European Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security Maroš Šefčovič and Canada’s Minister for International Trade Maninder Sidhu formally launched negotiations on an EU-Canada Digital Trade Agreement (European Commission, 2026a). According to the joint statement published on that occasion by both institutions, the agreement will complement CETA with a framework for digital trade designed to enhance legal certainty for businesses and strengthen consumer protection in digital transactions (European Commission and Government of Canada, 2026). A Government of Canada news release of 6 March 2026 reported that the same meeting adopted supplemental arbitration rules for investment disputes involving small and medium-sized enterprises, and concluded technical work to amend the Good Manufacturing Practices Protocol to include active pharmaceutical ingredients (Government of Canada, 2026). The joint statement also identified clean technology, energy and sustainable development as priorities for deeper cooperation alongside critical raw materials and digital trade.

The critical raw materials agenda illustrates how CETA’s institutional logic is extending into new strategic territory. The joint declaration adopted at the fourth EU-Canada Joint Ministerial Committee, held in Niagara on 12 November 2025, committed both sides to accelerate cooperation on raw materials value chains, explicitly mentioning rare earths and rare earth magnets, and launched an EU-Canada Economic Security Dialogue alongside a new Industrial Policy Dialogue covering strategic sectors (Council of the EU, 2025). Canada’s reserves of nickel and other critical minerals position it as a natural partner for an EU seeking to reduce dependence on a small number of dominant global suppliers. On the energy side, the June 2025 joint statement published by the Prime Minister of Canada committed both sides to continue the negotiation of a modernised Canada-Euratom Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, covering nuclear technologies including fuels and fuel cycle services (Prime Minister of Canada, 2025). This is a reiterated long-standing commitment rather than a new initiative; its inclusion in the 2025 summit communiqué reflects the growing weight of energy security in the bilateral agenda.

CETA was negotiated as a trade agreement. It is now being used as the foundation for something broader: a structured economic relationship capable of absorbing strategic priorities that its original drafters did not anticipate. In a fragmented global economy where building new trade architecture takes years of political capital, that institutional head start is itself a form of strategic advantage.

4. The Geopolitical Context

The urgency of the current moment did not arrive abstractly. The Global Affairs Canada briefing document prepared for parliamentary committee hearings in June 2025 stated explicitly that “recent US actions reinforce the need for Canada to diversify our trade, including through the negotiation of trade agreements with new partners” (Government of Canada, 2025). The same document described the scope of Ottawa’s diversification strategy: active negotiations with ASEAN partners, exploration of an expanded Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, renewed engagement with India, and consultations on resuming negotiations with the Mercosur bloc.

This diversification drive was not shaped by abstract strategic calculation alone. It was driven by a measurable vulnerability. According to Statistics Canada’s December 2024 merchandise trade release, published in February 2025, the United States was the destination for 75.9 percent of Canada’s total merchandise exports in 2024 (Statistics Canada, 2025). The consequences of that concentration became visible during the following year: Statistics Canada’s December 2025 merchandise trade release, published in February 2026, reported that Canada’s goods exports to the United States fell by 5.8 percent over the course of 2025, contributing to a merchandise trade deficit of 31.3 billion Canadian dollars, the largest since 2020 (Statistics Canada, 2026). The US share of Canadian goods exports fell to 71.7 percent, described by Statistics Canada as the lowest share since the early 1980s. According to the December 2025 monthly trade report published by Global Affairs Canada, annual goods exports to non-US markets rose by 17.2 percent in 2025 to an all-time high (Global Affairs Canada, 2026). The direction of change is clear and reflects deliberate policy.

The underlying logic of Canada’s diversification connects to a broader pattern of what is sometimes called middle-power coordination: the effort by states that cannot individually determine the terms of the international economic order to defend shared rules and reduce strategic vulnerabilities by aligning with like-minded partners. Canada cannot set global trade norms alone; nor can the EU, despite its considerable regulatory weight. Both, however, can shape the conditions under which those norms operate by building aligned institutional frameworks across the areas that matter most. In practice, this means coordination on digital trade standards, critical minerals governance, rules-based investment protection, economic security, and industrial policy. The Economic Security Dialogue and Industrial Policy Dialogue launched at the Niagara Joint Ministerial Committee in November 2025 are precisely this kind of alignment: not high-profile summitry, but the working-level calibration of shared interests across sectors that both sides recognize as strategic (Council of the EU, 2025).

Canada is not replacing the United States with Europe. The depth of North American economic integration and the structural dependencies built over decades make any rapid rebalancing impossible within a realistic timeframe. What Ottawa is doing is something more limited but strategically meaningful: reducing the risk that comes from having too few alternatives, so that a shift in US trade policy does not have the power to determine the shape of the entire Canadian economy. Europe is not a substitute for the United States; it is one of the few partners that can offer Canada both institutional reliability and meaningful market scale. Getting that calibration right will determine whether a relationship with considerable institutional potential delivers on it.

5. The security and defence dimensionRelations between the European Union and Canada offer an emblematic example of an increasingly complex and multifaceted international landscape. Economic and trade agreements are now accompanied by a wider set of issues which are not only interdependent but also closely connected to the role of other international actors.

Defence is perhaps the area that most clearly illustrates the deepening relationship between the two sides. At the same time, it should be recalled that this rapprochement continues to unfold within a broader framework, notably that of NATO and of other key partners, including the United States. As will be shown, the intensification of EU–Canada dialogue must remain firmly grounded in facts. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that a tangible convergence has taken place, with international security emerging as one of its most significant manifestations.

On the occasion of the 20th EU–Canada Summit, held on 23 June 2025, the parties signed, among other initiatives, a Security and Defence Partnership, thereby broadening bilateral cooperation across a range of strategic areas. These include support for Ukraine, crisis management and the promotion of international peace, as well as military mobility, maritime and space security, cyber resilience, and the response to hybrid threats. The partnership also encompasses more sensitive dimensions of contemporary security, such as arms control, non-proliferation, emerging technologies, and the external aspects of economic security (Council of the European Union, 2025).

The joint statement issued by the parties aptly captures this dynamic: “Our security is interconnected and interdependent. It is not limited to traditional military and defence-related issues, but is increasingly multidimensional, ranging from the rapidly evolving cyber, emerging tech and hybrid threats to maritime and outer space, including the protection of critical infrastructure, societal resilience, and economic security.”

Overall, the joint conclusion shows the parties’ intention to pursue a comprehensive and multifaceted agreement, capable of fitting coherently within the broader NATO framework.

More recently, European and Canadian trajectories have once again converged following the approval by the representatives of the Member States of the bilateral agreement with Canada within the framework of the regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe, SAFE, instrument (Council of the European Union, 2025).

As part of the European Union’s broader plan for joint rearmament, Canada is set to become the first non EU country to join the 150 billion euro defence instrument. More specifically, eligibility conditions will be extended to Canada in order to allow greater participation by Canadian legal entities. Procurement contracts will have to ensure that the cost of components not originating in the European Union, EFTA EEA states, or Ukraine does not exceed 35 percent of the estimated cost of the components of the final product.

This agreement has recently been formally consolidated through a decision by the Council of the European Union on its conclusion, thereby closing the process that had begun with the initial signing of the agreement on 14 February 2026 (Council of the European Union, 2026).

In the field of defence and security, relations between the two sides have thus acquired a concrete institutional dimension, bringing them closer together and contributing to the emergence of a shared understanding of contemporary geopolitics.

6. Shared values and multilateralism

The expansion of EU Canada cooperation across trade, economic security, technology, and defence is accompanied by a deeper political alignment rooted in shared values and multilateralism. The two sides have long presented their partnership as one founded on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for international law. In the current geopolitical context, however, these principles have acquired a more explicitly strategic meaning. They no longer function only as the normative background of the relationship, but increasingly serve as a basis for coordinated action in response to international instability, authoritarian challenges and the weakening of multilateral governance.

This convergence is particularly visible in the joint commitment of the European Union and Canada to the rules based international order. Both actors have a clear interest in preserving an international system in which rules, institutions and cooperation remain central to the management of global affairs (Council of the European Union, 2025). Neither the European Union nor Canada can shape the international order alone. Their influence depends, to a significant extent, on their ability to work with like minded partners and to defend the institutional frameworks that allow democratic actors to exercise political weight. In this sense, multilateralism is not merely a matter of diplomatic preference, but a strategic necessity.

Support for Ukraine represents one of the clearest examples of this alignment. Since the beginning of Russia’s full scale invasion, the European Union and Canada have repeatedly reaffirmed their support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. This position has not been limited to political declarations, but has also translated into sanctions, financial assistance, military support, and coordination within international forums. The issue of Ukraine therefore functions as a central point of convergence between Brussels and Ottawa, linking security, international law and the defence of the European order (Government of Canada, 2025).

At the same time, EU Canada cooperation extends well beyond the Ukrainian context. The two sides continue to coordinate within major multilateral institutions and forums, including the United Nations, the G7, the G20 and the World Trade Organization. These arenas remain essential for addressing global challenges that cannot be managed through bilateral relations alone, from climate change and energy security to trade fragmentation, development, technological governance, and the protection of human rights. In this respect, the partnership between the European Union and Canada reflects a shared understanding of international politics: global challenges require institutional responses, and democratic partners must work together to preserve the credibility of those institutions.

The joint declaration following the fourth Canada European Union Joint Ministerial Committee meeting, held in November 2025, confirms this approach. On that occasion, the parties reiterated their commitment to strengthen cooperation on foreign policy, security, economic resilience, climate action, and the defence of the rules based international order. The declaration also reaffirmed support for Ukraine and underlined the importance of cooperation in multilateral settings, showing how the EU Canada partnership increasingly operates across different but interconnected policy areas (Council of the European Union, 2025).

This dimension of the relationship gives political depth to the more practical forms of cooperation developed in recent years. Trade agreements, digital partnerships, critical raw materials initiatives, and defence cooperation are not isolated instruments. They are part of a wider attempt to build resilience among democratic partners in a more fragmented international environment. From this perspective, EU Canada relations should be understood not only as a bilateral partnership, but also as a contribution to the preservation of a rules based and cooperative international order.

Overall, shared values and multilateralism remain among the most stable foundations of the relationship between the European Union and Canada. Yet their meaning has changed. In a less predictable global environment, they are no longer simply expressions of political affinity. They have become tools through which the two sides seek to defend their interests, strengthen democratic resilience and respond collectively to challenges that neither could address effectively on its own.

7. Challenges, limits and open questions

Despite the significant progress achieved in recent years, the relationship between the European Union and Canada should not be idealized. Its evolution is promising, but it remains subject to a number of institutional, economic, and political constraints. These limits do not contradict the broader trend towards strategic convergence. Rather, they help clarify the actual scope of the partnership and prevent an overly linear reading of its development.

The first limitation concerns the institutional status of CETA. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement has been provisionally applied since 21 September 2017, meaning that most of its provisions are already in force. However, the agreement has not yet fully entered into force, since it still requires approval by all relevant national parliaments in the European Union and, in some cases, by regional parliaments as well. This is not merely a technical detail. It shows that even among like minded partners, trade liberalization and economic integration remain exposed to domestic political constraints, legal procedures and different national sensitivities. In this sense, CETA represents both the strength and the fragility of the EU Canada relationship: it has already produced concrete effects, but its full institutional consolidation remains incomplete (European Commission, 2026).

A second challenge concerns the asymmetry between the two partners. The European Union is a much larger market and one of the most influential regulatory actors in the world, while Canada remains a medium sized economy whose external relations are still strongly shaped by its North American environment. For Canada, the European Union represents a crucial partner for diversification, economic resilience, and strategic autonomy. For the European Union, Canada is an important and reliable partner, but it is not always as central as other priorities, including the United States, China, Ukraine, the United Kingdom or the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. The partnership is therefore strategically useful for both sides, but not equally central to both.

This asymmetry becomes even clearer when considering Canada’s structural dependence on the United States. In 2024, the United States was the destination for 75.9 percent of Canada’s total exports, while also accounting for 62.2 percent of its total imports (Statistics Canada, 2025). The same figure is confirmed when looking specifically at domestic exports, with three quarters of Canadian domestic exports directed to the US market in 2024 (Statistics Canada, 2025). These data are essential for understanding the real meaning of Canada’s diversification strategy. Ottawa is not replacing the United States with Europe. Rather, it is trying to reduce the strategic risks associated with having too few alternatives. Diversification is therefore possible, but it will necessarily be gradual, selective and concentrated in specific sectors where EU Canada cooperation can generate clear added value.

There are also political limits within the European Union itself. Member states do not always share the same level of enthusiasm for closer cooperation with Canada, nor do they necessarily converge on all the policy areas that have become central to the bilateral agenda. Differences may emerge on the future of CETA, nuclear energy, liquefied natural gas, industrial policy, defence procurement, and the balance between economic openness and strategic autonomy. These divergences matter because EU Canada cooperation depends not only on shared declarations at summit level, but also on the capacity of European institutions and member states to translate political commitments into practical implementation.

External uncertainty further complicates the picture. The evolution of the United States’ political cycle, future trade tensions, global economic slowdown, and new geopolitical crises could all affect the pace and direction of EU Canada cooperation. In some cases, instability may push Brussels and Ottawa closer together by reinforcing the need for reliable democratic partners. In others, it may redirect attention and resources towards more urgent theatres of crisis. The durability of the commitments made in 2025 and 2026 will therefore depend on whether the two sides are able to institutionalize their cooperation beyond the immediate geopolitical moment.

The European Parliament’s 2026 recommendation on enhanced EU Canada cooperation reflects this ambivalent context. On the one hand, it recognizes Canada as a like minded and strategic partner at a time of increasing geopolitical rivalry, supply chain fragmentation, protectionism, and threats to the rules based international order. On the other hand, it also points to the need to make better use of existing instruments, strengthen implementation, and adapt the partnership to a more unstable international environment. This confirms that the central question is no longer whether the European Union and Canada share common interests and values, but whether they can turn this convergence into sustained and effective cooperation.

Overall, the main challenge for EU Canada relations lies in the gap between political ambition and structural reality. The partnership has become broader, more strategic, and more relevant, but it remains constrained by incomplete ratification, economic asymmetries, Canadian dependence on the United States, internal European divergences, and external volatility. Recognizing these limits does not weaken the argument for closer cooperation. On the contrary, it makes it more credible. The relationship is valuable precisely because it offers both sides a way to reduce vulnerability, diversify partnerships, and strengthen democratic resilience, even if it cannot eliminate the structural constraints that shape their respective foreign and economic policies.

8. Final remarks and conclusion

The coming months will be important for assessing whether the recent acceleration in EU Canada relations can be translated into sustained and operational cooperation. Several developments will deserve particular attention. The first is the negotiation of the EU Canada Digital Trade Agreement, formally launched in March 2026, which represents an attempt to update the economic relationship to the realities of the digital economy. Building on CETA, the future agreement is intended to make digital trade easier and safer, strengthen consumer protection online and support open, secure and rules based trade between like minded partners (European Commission, 2026).

This development is particularly relevant because it confirms that CETA is no longer only a trade liberalization agreement in the traditional sense. It has become the institutional basis on which the European Union and Canada can build new forms of cooperation in areas that are increasingly central to economic security. Digital trade, trusted data flows, clean technologies, critical raw materials, and investment facilitation are not separate from the broader strategic agenda. They are part of the same effort to adapt bilateral cooperation to a more fragmented global economy, where resilience and diversification have become essential policy objectives.

The implementation of the Security and Defence Partnership will be equally important. The agreement signed in 2025 created a political framework for deeper coordination, but its relevance will depend on whether the two sides are able to give it practical content over time. The same applies to Canada’s participation in the SAFE instrument, which could become a significant test of the extent to which EU Canada cooperation can move from political alignment to defence industrial cooperation. In this field, the question is not only whether Brussels and Ottawa share similar views on international security, but whether they can coordinate capabilities, procurement priorities, and strategic planning in a credible way.

Other areas will also require close attention. Cooperation on critical raw materials and clean technologies will remain central to the relationship, especially as both sides seek to secure sustainable supply chains and reduce exposure to geopolitical dependencies. The work of the CETA Joint Committee and of the Joint Ministerial Committee will also be relevant, since these institutional formats can help transform broad political commitments into more concrete forms of coordination. In this sense, the future of the partnership will depend less on declarations of shared values and more on the capacity to implement existing instruments effectively.

The European Parliament’s 2026 recommendation on enhanced EU Canada cooperation confirms the political relevance of this moment. By calling for stronger cooperation in light of the current geopolitical context and the threats to Canada’s economic stability and sovereignty, the recommendation places the relationship within a wider debate on democratic resilience, economic security, and strategic diversification (European Parliament, 2026). It also shows that EU Canada relations are increasingly understood not as a peripheral component of transatlantic affairs, but as a useful and increasingly necessary partnership in a less predictable international order.

Ultimately, EU Canada relations are becoming less a matter of diplomatic affinity and more a matter of strategic necessity. The partnership is not as visible as EU-US relations, nor as urgent as EU Ukraine relations. Yet it is precisely this relative discretion that makes it valuable. It offers the European Union a stable, democratic, and resource rich partner while giving Canada an opportunity to broaden its international options without abandoning its North American foundations. The relationship therefore combines values, trade, resources, security, and multilateral coordination in a way that responds directly to the pressures of the current global environment.

The main challenge will be to ensure that this convergence does not remain merely rhetorical. If the European Union and Canada are able to implement the instruments already created, advance digital and defence cooperation, and make better use of CETA’s institutional architecture, their partnership could become one of the most practical examples of democratic resilience across the Atlantic. It may not define the future of transatlantic relations on its own, but it can help show how like minded partners can cooperate in a fragmented international order without relying exclusively on traditional power politics.

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